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INTRODUCTION

What is the role of the state in man's final end? This question
provides the framework for exploration in my Church & State seminar.
We begin the course with the Decalogue or Ten Commandments from the
Books of Exodus and Deuteronomy' as the first legislative document that
informs the people how to live for the purposes of ordering their lives with
the divine. It is also the point where civil and religious governance are
united in the person of Moses as judge.2 While this document offers no
form of government, it creates a foundation for order through behavior that
comports with the will of God. Accretions of laws and regulations follow
for centuries, but instead of being followed to worship the one true God,
they were followed for worldly gain, inspiring the prophets to preach
repentance and the turning of hearts back to God. It is only with the
Incarnation that we see God expressing in the person of Jesus Christ the
fulfillment of the whole of the Law, making it publicly known that simply
obeying the laws is not enough when the goal of compliance is not the
fulfillment of a code, but eternal life.
Once we enter the Christian era, God reveals that his kingdom is not
of this world when Jesus tells the Pharisees to render unto Caesar what is
Caesar'S. 4 From that point forward, the Church has struggled mightily to
develop the doctrine, which recognizes the divine nature of authority as it
pertains to the relationship between the Church and the State.
I.

JOHN FINNIS AND THE FOUNDATION OF A THEORY

In chronicling this struggle, we come to our current study, which
explores the problem in the context of the modem state's duty to its people
vis-i-vis religion. I begin with John Finnis, who seeks to find the place of
religion in political communities through philosophical and historical
inquiry in his article, Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources.5
His method is founded upon the notion that the human person exists for a
purpose, that there is a cause for his existence, and that this cause is a

1. Exodus 20:1-17; Deuteronomy 5:6-21 (New American Bible).
2. Id.; see also Exodus 18:13 ("The next day Moses sat in judgment for the
people....").
3. See John 1:14 ("And the Word became flesh and made his dwelling among us, and
we saw his glory, the glory as of the Father's only Son, full of grace and truth.")
4. Matthew 22:21.
5. John Finnis, Religion and State: Some Main Issues and Sources, 51 AM. J. JuRs.
107 (2006) [hereinafter Religion and State].
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transcendent reality that has communicated to us a purpose in order to
explain our existence, including the mystery of how we share meaning and
6
This
intentions among ourselves as well as with the divine.
communication can be called "revelation," but accepting it as such requires
no act of faith or submission to dogmatic teachings of a church.7 His
judgment, that there are revelatory communications, may draw upon
theological arguments to show that the content of this revelation is in
accord with reason but does not introduce the need to make an act of faith.
Finnis comes to a conclusion-disquieting for most modern political
theorists and theologians of whatever stripe-that the state, without
injustice or impropriety, may identify the true religious faith and
community-a true religion-as the vehicle moving toward the final goal
of human good and happiness.9 At first blush, this may seem to many
(perhaps most) to be contrary to the foundations of the modern democratic
state. This is because Finnis' conclusion cuts against the historical,
political, and legal development in the West from theocratic or monarchical
constructions of governance toward a modern notion of "separation of
church and state." However, Finnis' argument is that, in light of its
obligation to maintain public order, the state must remove adherents of
social groups whose beliefs adversely affect public morality as far as
possible from political communities that acknowledge religious freedom. 10
In so doing, the state is discriminating in its treatment of religions and, as a
side effect, is making a decision about the content of a religion. This state
duty to not only abstain from religious coercion but to prevent individuals
and social groups from impinging on this right to be free from coercion on
their religious beliefs and acts is not, in Finnis' opinion, contrary to a
thoroughly just positive determination that one religion is the true
religion.11 Is this the position of the Church? Does the Church teach-and
has the Church taught-that the state must publicly identify the true
religion? The Church certainly teaches that the fullness of Christianity is
found in the teachings of the Catholic Church founded by the Savior and
built upon the rock that is Peter.12 In the exploration of this political and

6. See id at 107-09 (introducing major concepts within the article).
7. Id. at 109.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 127-30.
10. Id. at 126-28.
11. Id.at 117-30.
12. See Matthew 16:18 (depicting Jesus saying, "you are Peter, and upon this rock I will
build My church").
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philosophical conclusion, I wanted to examine Finnis' theory in the light
and context of the Church's struggle with her own place in the world.
A critical source for Finnis' theory that provides the foundation for
tying true religion to the political state is the Vatican II document
Dignitatis Humanae.13 Mindful of this, I think it a fruitful exercise to
review, compare, and contrast the history and development of the Church's
teaching on the relationship between church and state. The intent is to
illuminate parallels between Finnis' position and that of the Church. The
method will be to shine a focused light upon Church doctrine as it has
developed regarding the relationship between the Church and the state and
to review the details of Finnis' argument so as to reveal the superstructure
of his argument concerning the obligation of a state to identify the true
religion. I shall attempt to investigate this theory against a historical
backdrop of church-state relations as these may be viewed through Catholic
Church documents, focusing upon several significant Church documents,
beginning with the Syllabus Errorum of Pius IX in 1864.14 Then I will
cover both Immortale Dei'5 and Libertas,16 promulgated by Pope Leo XIII
in 1885 and 1888, respectively. Pacem in Terrisl7 of John XXIII will
follow, and I will conclude with Fides et Ratio,' t John Paul II's encyclical
on faith and reason from September of 1998. My assumption in using
these documents is that these teachings are a product of the Magisterium
and owed certain deference. I do not intend here to explore the level of
magisterial authority that these documents carry or how they are to be
followed by the faithful, but rather emphasize simply that they come from

13. Council Vatican II, Declaration on Religious Freedom, DignitatisHumanae (Dec.
7, 1965) [hereinafter Dignitatis Humanae], http://www.vatican.va/archive/histcouncils/
ii vatican council/documents/vat-ii decl 19651207 dignitatis-humanaeen.html.
14. Pope Pius IX, Encyclical Letter, Syllabus Errorum (1864) [hereinafter Syllabus
Errorum], http://www.ccel.org/ccel/schaff/creeds2.v.i.iv.htm.
15. Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, Immortale Dei (1885) [hereinafter Immortale
Dei], http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/leo-xiii/encyclicals/documents/hf 1-xiii enc 0111
1885_immortale-dei en.html.
16. Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, Libertas (1888) [hereinafter Libertas],
http://www.vatican.va/holy_father/leo-xiiilencyclicals/documents/hf 1-xiii enc 20061888
libertas en.html.
17. Pope John XXIII, Encyclical Letter, Pacem in Terris (Apr. 11, 1963) [hereinafter
Pacem in Terris], http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnxxiiilencyclicals/documents/hf jxxiii enc_1 1041963_pacem en.html.
18. Pope John Paul 11, Encyclical Letter, Fides et Ratio (Sept. 14, 1998) [hereinafter
Fides et Ratio], http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/johnpaul-ii/encyclicals/documents/
hf jp-ii enc 15101998_fides-et-ratio en.html.
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the teaching authority of the Church and offer the reader an avenue for
finding truth.
II.

EXPOSITION OF THE THEORY

The premise on which this theory-and nearly all of Finnis' work-is
based is the notion that truth is available to all and that knowledge of truth
does not rely upon revelation, but is accessible to each person through
reason. 19 This is hardly revolutionary or even controversial. In his Epistle
to the Romans, St. Paul rebuked those who suppress the truth-for even
without the Gospel, all are obliged to know God through his creationdeclaring: "Ever since the creation of the world, his invisible attributes of
eternal power and divinity have been able to be understood and perceived
in what he has made. As a result, they have no excuse . . . ."20 Indeed,
Finnis appears to seize upon this presumption (indirectly, for he does not
cite the passage) and sets the foundation for his theory of religion and state
not directly on Scripture, but on a "transcendent source of reality" upon
which his arguments are to be made. 2 1 This is so important that he
qualifies his presentation at the outset as historical and factual, not
How can the intellectual inquiry into transcendent
theological.22
communication not be theological? Finnis contends that this source is
accessible through empirical natural and social sciences. 23
Basing his theory on a non-theological, transcendent source of reality
is the point at which many a modem philosopher will part ways with
Finnis. More than that, many will reject anything he discovers using this
method as flawed, considering it to be in opposition to the presumed
philosophical axiom that Athens and Jerusalem can never meet.24 On the
19. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 129.
20. Romans 1:20.
21. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 107.
22. Id.
23. Id.
24. As Strauss explains:
Philosophy has to grant that revelation is possible. But to grant that revelation is
possible means . . . to grant that the philosophic life is not necessarily, not
evidently, the right life. Philosophy, the life devoted to the quest for evident
knowledge available to man as man, would itself rest on an unevident, arbitrary,
or blind decision. This would merely confirm the thesis of faith, that there is no
possibility of consistency, of a consistent and thoroughly sincere life, without
belief in revelation. The mere fact that philosophy and revelation cannot refute
each other would constitute the refutation of philosophy by revelation.
LEO STRAUSS, NATURAL RIGHTS AND HISTORY 75 (1965).
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contrary, however, I would maintain that philosophical and historical truth
must include the reality of the divine to avoid nonsensical intellectual
meanderings and looking at facts as truth in and of themselves. Finnis
shares this position, holding that Jerusalem can remain safely in the realm
of theology while we pursue a philosophical understanding of truth and
divine causality. 25 One must access faith. In other words, in his attempt to
present an understanding of religion and state, Finnis makes theology not
subordinate, but rather a discipline simply providing added clarity to
philosophical inquiries. 26 We will explore that position in due course, but
we can situate the position of Finnis precipitously (and perhaps
precariously) between these adverse methodologies which form-for their
proponents-a pathway to a cogent philosophical anthropology.
Finnis does not simply presume upon the existence of a transcendent
communication but argues forcefully for its philosophical legitimacy. 27 His
are truly philosophical arguments for the existence of God. I do not want
to rehash the arguments here because they are tangential to our project, but
we can say that Finnis' arguments bring him to the judgment that there is a
transcendent reality commonly referred to as "God" and that God, this
intelligent, transcendent reality, knowing that we ourselves are free and
have intelligence, might share with us the meaning of the existence of our
universe.28 This is "Revelation."
We have a foundation, therefore, that is interdependently historical
and philosophical, the former demonstrating concrete revelation in human
affairs, and the latter explaining the existence and necessity of the
transcendent and the divine. Moreover, the reasonableness of this
communication from the divine to the human being allows for the
revelation to take place beyond what is commonly understood as the "laws
of nature" in a given time and place. 29 This theoretical foundation
25. See id at 109-11.
26. Id. at 109.
27. See id. at 109-10 (maintaining that it is not "beyond reason to expect that the course
of human history might well include events, of communicative significance, going beyond
or contrary to the laws that generally structure affairs").
28. Id. at 108-10.
29. Because we are dealing here with imperfect human beings, a third dimension Finnis
would have us consider is the credibility of the one who asserts the revelation and its
content. Id. at 110. One who is morally flawed undermines the message, regardless of the
skill with which the message is presented. Id. at 110-11. Credibility is also undermined if
the prophet is authorized by his revelation to impose his message by force and to discipline
those refusing to adopt his faith with "death or servitude." Id. at 111 (citing THOMAS
AQUINAS, SUMMA CONTRA GENTILES I, c. 6). Such coercion through the threat of death
should be juxtaposed with those prophets who are themselves willing to die rather than to
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expresses the actual foundation for the source of truth that does not require
an act of faith, but simply an openness to divine communication.
A.

The Public Square

In the name of separation of church and state and the relegation of
religion to simply a private affair, a transcendent context or pole for
discussions regarding the workings of the state has largely been snuffed
out. This has been accomplished by considering discussions about the state
to be an exercise in "reason" from which matters of faith should be
excluded. A corollary to this is that religion has nothing of "reasoned"
substance to add to the debate. In fact, religion is considered to be
irrelevant since faith is a private matter-it is simply a choice.
Faith is a choice in the sense that one chooses between acting and not
acting, between following or not following a divine call. The modem
notion of choice, however, has been severed from the transcendent and
turned into an expression of desire. This has been no more clearly stated
than in the Supreme Court case of Planned Parenthoodof Southeastern
Pennsylvania v. Casey in which we are told that we have the right "to
define one's own concept of existence, of meaning, of the universe, and of
the mystery of human life." 30 The elemental flaw in this error stems from
the focus on the self. One can use the psychological euphemism of selfrespect or self-determination; it is, nonetheless, the expression of what Eric
Voegelin referred to as the "Egophanic Revolt" in which the concentration
on the self, the ego, eclipses the epiphany of God.31 Once this happens,
everything that exists is defined by reference to the self instead of reference
to the eternal.3 2
Finnis takes this concept further and sees not only the rejection of the
divine in opinions such as Casey, but also a failure to align oneself with the
transcendent intelligence that is the prime cause of one's own intelligence
renounce that which they believe and preach. Id. Therefore, not only is the faith the
prophet preaches scrutinized, but the scrutiny is done in the light of the moral actions or of
the adherents, teachers, and preachers. If one says, "Believe or die," and another says, "I
testify to this truth on pain of death," the contrast provides powerful evidence for the
validity of the message of self-sacrifice and subsequently the reasonableness of using that
message as a substantive foundation for a philosophical anthropology. Id
30. Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833, 851 (1992).
31. ERIc VOEGELIN, ORDER AND HISTORY, VOL. IV: THE ECUMENIC AGE 326-33 (Univ.
Mo. Press 2000).
32. The language in Casey should remind us that what has become increasingly
important in Supreme Court cases is less the holdings than the dicta, which pass for
reasoning, but are in fact often philosophical opinions.
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and will.33 Truth, in that case, is not discovered through openness to the
divine but is expressed in a distorted fashion through self-will. For Finnis,
34
this amounts to an abandonment of genuine reason.
B. Religion as a ConstitutionalRight
The reduction of religion to a mere constitutional right disconnects it
from its transcendent source and makes the truth that religion seeks to find
end with the state. The current analysis of religion and state by Finnis
In this
stems from his magnum opus, Natural Law & Natural Rights.
tome, Finnis tells us that of the basic goods in life, religion takes a primary
His list of basic goods includes life, knowledge, aesthetic
place.
appreciation, play, friendship, practical reasonableness, and religion. 37
Without delving into these goods in detail, it is important to note that
Finnis views religion as a basic good for its own sake.3 The alternative
view, he believes, reduces religion to nothing more than the Casey version
of defining the universe for oneself. Furthermore, not only is religion
reduced and exiled from the realm of reason, but hostility ensues when
religion is seen as a restriction on one's "deep concerns" and desires. The
distortion is complete when "deep concerns" are equated with one's
"conscience." 3 9 Genuine discourse on religion and state must instead
include in the critical debate the affirming of God along with the common
good through engagement of the practical reason.40
It is difficult not to agree with Finnis that the strictly permissive
notion of religion in the documents of the formation of a government
leaves much to be desired. It is quite another premise to say that the
government, in those documents, can identify the true religion. It certainly
happens, however, even to this day. In 2005, the newly minted Iraqi
Constitution in Section 1, Article 2 (after Article 1, which establishes the
state) proclaims in no uncertain terms: "Islam is the official religion of the

33. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 112.
34. Id.
35. JOHN FINNIS, NATURAL LAW &NATURAL RIGHTS (1st ed. 1980).
36. Id. at 85-86.
37. Id. at 85-90.
38. Id. at 89-90.
39. Religion andState, supra note 5, at 108.
40. "Practical reason" is featured in Natural Law & Natural Rights as the concept
which answers how we acquire knowledge of the basic goods. See, e.g., id. at 100-03.
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Immediately
State and it is a fundamental source of legislation." 4 1
following this declaration, the text states that: "No law that contradicts the
established provisions of Islam may be established." 4 2 The problem with
this, Finnis might argue, is that Islam is not a religion that the state can
reasonably proclaim as having no errors in terms of public order since
conversion by force is called for. We will explore this shortly.
The Polish Constitution, ratified in 1997, takes a middle road which
includes in the citizenry: "Both those who believe in God as the source of
truth, justice, good and beauty, as well as those not sharing such faith but
respecting those universal values as arising from other sources, equal in
rights and obligations towards the common good."4 3 Accordingly, defining
"universal values" and "the common good" becomes the duty of the
government.
These specific examples aside, it would be worth exploring further
what it means to "identify the true religion." Can this be done outside of
foundational governmental documents? Finnis does not address it, and we
cannot explore it further here. However, a question must arise when we
look at all the religious trappings that drape the history of the American
founding-it is difficult not to see that the truth of religion was expressed
in so many ways but has been categorized as "historical" or part of the
tradition.4 In any case, if we look to religion as simply a right among
others (such as property rights) the transcendent source of truth is not
accessed, and God is not affirmed. If the state is not affirming divine
reality, is it not doing the opposite? If religion is good, does not the state
have the obligation to affirm its direct source?
C. History and Order
An important component of the rational foundation underpinning a
discussion of church and state (in addition to the fact that there is divine
41. DOUSTOUR JOUMHOURIAT AL-IRAQ [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF IRAQ] Oct.
15, 2005, § 1, art. 2, translatedin Full Text of Iraqi Constitution, THE WASHINGTON POST
12, 2005), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/10/12/
(Oct.
AR2005101201450.html.
42. Id.
43.

KONSTYTUCJA RZECZYPOSPOLITEJ POLSKIEJ [CONSTITUTION OF THE REPUBLIC OF
Apr. 2, 1997, pmbl., translated in Poland, WORLD INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY

POLAND]

http://www.wipo.int/wipolex/en/text.jsp?file-id=194980 (last visited Oct.
17, 2012).
44. Marsh v. Chambers, 463 U.S. 783, 792 (1983) (upholding the state practice of
hiring chaplains and offering prayers in the legislature "[i]n light of the unambiguous and
unbroken history of more than 200 years").
ORGANIZATION,
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revelation that must be accounted for in the discussion) is the notion that
since these communications originate with the divine and are to be received
by human beings in time, the communications must necessarily be set in
human history. The historical documents of the Old and New Testaments
are the main source of that record of divine-human relation and
communication. The Gospels of the four evangelists and the Acts of the
Apostles, especially, offer concrete historical evidence of this
communication through the person of Jesus Christ. There are many views
as to why the Scriptures have lost public influence, not least of which is the
oft-misunderstood concept of separation of church and state. Finnis,
however, believes that these documents have lost much influence because
scripture scholars have deconstructed them so as to eliminate their
transcendent nature and leave them as references simply to the "Historical
Jesus," 45 explicitly rejecting their divine component, which is seen most
vividly through the performance of miracles.46 In rejecting miracles, Finnis
contends, such scripture scholars-instead of accounting for revelation in
philosophical debate-employ an irrational and philosophically unfounded
departure from the inclusion of the Gospel testimony as historically valid.4 7
I would argue that the documents have lost value not due simply to their
dissection by scripture scholars, but because the proclamation of the truth
of the Gospels has been relegated to Sunday sermons and televangelists.
Since order in human affairs is a reflection of divine order, if we make no
public accounting for a source of truth we must create that source
ourselves. Principles that derive from our own image instead of absolute
truth are necessarily flawed and cannot provide a foundation for others to
engage society for the common good.

45. The "Quest for the Historical Jesus" is not a new project but received much
attention (and much criticism) in recent years due to efforts by scholars. See, e.g., JOHN
DoMINIc CROSSAN, JESUS: A REVOLUTIONARY BIOGRAPHY (1994).
46. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 115-16.
47. Id. Finnis describes the deterioration in belief in the Gospel testimony as an almost
concerted effort by scripture scholars to "poison the root of the tree." Id. at 115. The
deniability of the historicity of the Gospel is accomplished by insisting that everything in the
Gospels is a post AD 70 retrojection, hence making all the testimony a creation of the
Gospel authors. Id. This, it is argued, is a reasonable explication because human beings
cannot predict the future and, since we find in the Gospels the foretelling of the fall of
Jerusalem, the accounts preserved are no more than stories invented by the writers. Id. The
syllogism is quite clever: Since the Gospels were written after AD 70 and claimed to predict
the future, if Jesus had been divine, he could have done so. Id. at 115-16. But since he did
not truly "predict" anything, he presumably couldn't predict anything, and therefore he
wasn't divine. Id. at 116. This allows scholars to reject any historical use of the Gospels in
any fashion beyond the possibility that he existed and that, at most, he was merely human.
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D. Freedomfrom Religious Coercion by Government or Others
The intersection of religion and governance was never more clearly
defined as in the first legislative document of this nature, the Decalogue.
While the Ten Commandments are not a model for a governmental
structure, the source of the law was never in question. Accretions that
followed presented a distorted image of the truth in the Tablets, but the
transcendent foundation remained. In the modem world, therefore, without
Revelation as a foundational element in public discourse, and with atheism
incorrectly understood as the governmental default position, we must
explore how a nation's laws and policies should affect religion.
Since the place of religion in modem political communities has been
separated from the divine, Finnis describes the strengths and limitations of
political expression at the intersection of the historical and the
transcendent. 4 9 The touch point is the concept of coercion.50 The United
States Constitution expresses this intersection by protecting the "free
exercise" of religion." 5' The European Convention expresses the right as
"freedom of thought, conscience and religion." 52 The Second Vatican
Council expressed it more fully in Dignitatis Humanae, emphasizing not
the "rights" but "immunity from coercion in civil society,"5 3 and not only
coercion from the government, but also from others whose actions cause
conflicts that endanger public peace. 5 4 The reasoning for this is twofold: the
48. Exodus 20:1-17; Deuteronomy 5:6-21.
49. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 117.
50. Id.
51. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
52. European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms, art. 9, § 1, Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221.
53. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 13, 1.
54. Id. 7. It is worthwhile to note paragraph 7 of DignitatisHumanae, the Second
Vatican Council's Declaration on Religions Liberty, to which we will return often and
which offers a much deeper understanding of the human person in community than any
simply autonomous creature with "rights." The Second Vatican Council provided that:
The right to religious freedom is exercised in human society: hence its exercise
is subject to certain regulatory norms. In the use of all freedoms the moral
principle of personal and social responsibility is to be observed. In the exercise of
their rights, individual men and social groups are bound by the moral law to have
respect both for the rights of others and for their own duties toward others and for
the common welfare of all. Men are to deal with their fellows in justice and
civility.
Furthermore, society has the right to defend itself against possible abuses
committed on the pretext of freedom of religion. It is the special duty of
government to provide this protection. However, government is not to act in an
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first and primary premise is that, because God has made known to man
through Jesus Christ how man must live and be saved, every man has the
duty to seek the truth of God and to embrace it.55 In order to accomplish
this, so goes the second premise, man must be free to do so-immune not
only from political, but from psychological coercion as well.56
The overall problem with coercion appears obvious to most, but the
limits of what coercion can and cannot accomplish are not so clear. Finnis
attempts to shed light on this by reflecting on the thought of Thomas
Aquinas.s? It is the temporal that the state has control over and through
which it must act for the common good.5 8 The state does not have any
authority over internal acts. 5 9 The external acts must be controlled to the
degree that they interfere with public peace and common good. 60 Neither
Finnis nor Thomas would make a sharp divide between external and
internal, for every external act flows from one that is internal. In fact,
Aquinas makes clear the distinction: external acts are the product of willed
intentions. 6 1 As such, the internal acts are inaccessible to political
authorities. 62 Furthermore, acts of disposition are similarly off-limits to
government authorities.63 These acts are choices regarding one's state in
life, such as whom to marry or whether to make a religious vow.

arbitrary fashion or in an unfair spirit of partisanship. Its action is to be controlled
by juridical norms which are in conformity with the objective moral order. These
norms arise out of the need for the effective safeguard of the rights of all citizens
and for the peaceful settlement of conflicts of rights, also out of the need for an
adequate care of genuine public peace, which comes about when men live
together in good order and in true justice, and finally out of the need for a proper
guardianship of public morality.
These matters constitute the basic component of the common welfare: they are
what is meant by public order. For the rest, the usages of society are to be the
usages of freedom in their full range: that is, the freedom of man is to be respected
as far as possible and is not to be curtailed except when and insofar as necessary.
Id.
55. Id. 12.
56. Id.
57. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 120-21.
58. Id. at 119-20.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 120-22.
61. Id. at 120 (citing THOMAS AQUINAS, MORAL,
(Oxford University Press ed., 1998)).
62. Id.
63. Id. at 121.
64. Id.
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Moreover, matters of faith and worship, which should be regarded in the
same way, deal with each person individually. 65 DignitatisHumanae uses
these arguments to support the primacy of one's duty to seek the truth and
follow it. 6 6 Seeking the truth cannot be accomplished under coercion or
"psychological pressure," which Finnis sets off in scare quotes to identify, I
believe, the fact that such language is a modem term that really adds
nothing to the notion of coercion and perhaps even blurs the line between
what the law actually has access to.67 In any event, Finnis points out these
traditional arguments, distinguishing the internal from the external, to
reinforce the notion that, in defending the natural human right to religious
liberty, the Vatican Council has operated under the assumption that "error
has no rights."6 8 There must, therefore, be no coercion; such would be to
interfere with the seeking of truth. 69 This means, significantly, that not
simply is there an absence of a duty to proclaim a false religion, "there is
no moral liberty" to do so. 70
The logic for the foundation used by Finnis here that error has no
rights is not so clear. He seems to be saying that because the Council
asserts that there are these two realms of authority, they are distinct, and
there is a traditional foundation for the arguments and principles in support
of the distinction;71 ipso facto, the "old thought" that error has no rights
remains unchallenged and revelation can be used philosophically. While
this basic idea is intuitively reasonable to accept, his method of arriving at
it seems to jump simply from truth to truth without a clear link between
them. He takes a theological truth and commends it to a philosophical

65. Id.
66. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 13, I ("On their part, all men are bound to seek
the truth, especially in what concerns God and His Church, and to embrace the truth they
come to know, and to hold fast to it.").
67. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 121.
68. Id.
69. Id. Finnis argues that this principle is supported by the use in philosophical
arguments of both revelation and divinely guided ecclesiastical tradition. Id. at 121-22. If
we render unto Caesar the external, the internal is left for religion to guide. Id. at 121. The
support for using the arguments this way, as did Thomas Aquinas, is laid out by delineating
the distinction in the jurisdiction between the Church and the world. The Church has
maintained, as Finnis states, "[F]rom the earliest apostolic times onward the unbroken
refusal to countenance any attempt to coerce someone to embrace the Christian faith against
his or her own will." Id. The corollary premise is that there is no history or worldly
tradition in which the state has interfered successfully to change a teaching of the Church
held in the experience of divinely guided tradition.
70. Id. at 122.
71. See id. at 121 (explaining the jurisdictional division between church and state).
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argument. Nevertheless, this jump, if accepted, establishes an important
new premise: there is no right to proclaim a false religion.7 2 This premise
leads Finnis to the conclusion that the state has the duty to restrict any
proclamation of a false religion.73 Equally important is that there is a right
to be immune from coercion and the state must intervene to prevent such
coercion.7 4
E.

Forms of Governance

A brief review of several governmental structures and how each of
them deals with an understanding of freedom from coercion would be
illustrative of the theoretical constructions we have made. Most would
agree that since the state is responsible for the temporal good, it must take
responsibility not for the salvation of the individual but instead for the
complimentary duty of protecting the common good in society through
One could go further and say that in
maintenance of public order.
maintaining public order, the state provides a civic environment in which
the soul can grow toward perfection, exercising freely its purpose to seek
truth. How this responsibility is seen and taken by different polities
depends on the source of authority upon which the government bases it
laws. A favorable secularist vieW76 permits religious acts because,
although it may reject religion as irrational, it does recognize that religion
is a part of society, of relationships, and that it constitutes the value
structures of a large portion of the members of the given society. Finnis
sees this position as necessary for secularists because allowing this
"freedom" of religious acts, for the reason that they are "activities" of
society and that they are expressions of people's "passions,"78 also allows
for the expression of rights established in Supreme Court decisions, such as
those concerning consensual homosexual sodomy and elective abortions.79
72. Id. at 122 ("[T]here is no moral liberty to proclaim a false religion.").
73. Id. at 121-22.

74. Id.
75. Id. at 122.
76. Finnis, without giving examples, points out that there are many examples of
secularists views, especially in the twentieth century, where religion barely received
constitutional respect, if any tolerance at all. See id. at 123 (explaining the lack of respect
secularists often have for religion).
77. Id. at 122-23.
78. Id. at 122.
79. See generally Lawrence v. Texas, 539 U.S. 558 (2003); Planned Parenthood v.
Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992); Bowers v. Hardwick, 478 U.S. 186 (1986); Roe v. Wade, 410
U.S. 113 (1973).

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol35/iss1/1

14

Wagner: The Obligation of Government Toward Humanity: The Role of the Sta

2012]

OBLIGATION OF GOVERNMENT TOWARD HUMANITY

15

Finnis notes, however, that such activities tend not to be acts of conscience
but expressions of emotional desires that are "so often the subject of
belated rational regret., 8 0
At the other end of the spectrum from the avowed secular state, we
find theocracies. 8 ' Finnis looks at post-Reformation England and the
modem Islamic State. 82 After the formation of the Church of England in
the sixteenth century, church and state became one, with the leaders of the
church chosen by the state and the acts of worship determined in the
political assembly. 83 In Islam, there are two forms: the Sunni form, where
the state appoints religions leaders, and the Shiite form in which the
political community is subordinate and subject to the religious leaders.84
The Catholic Church's doctrine of religious liberty stands firmly
between these political extremes, seen and expressed in the Second Vatican
Council document Dignitatis Humanae," where we can see more clearly
the Catholic Church's position as "part of what it is to be central to
civilization" as it takes on opponents on the Left, like American secularism
and various forms of Communist oppression, and, on the Right, anti86
Christian theocracies.
F.

The Modern State and DignitatisHumanae

Religious liberty is central to Catholic Church teaching.87 This does
not mean that the Church has abandoned the position that there is one
Church founded by Jesus Christ. Instead, it is a recognition that human
beings are free and that they must come to the truth of their own volition.8
Finnis depends upon this notion for his ultimate conclusion, and it is in
some sense the prime motivating factor in my exploration of his theory. It
is important to pay close attention to the premises of his logical
constructions. He relies upon the position of Joseph Boyle in order to

80. Religion andState, supra note 5, at 123.
8 1. Id.
8 2. Id.
8 3. Id.
84. Id. Finnis here presents a charge and perhaps a criticism that these instantiations of
religion have not "convincingly been shown to be unfaithful to the core texts or traditions of
Islam's purported divine communication .... " Id.
85. DignitatisHumanae, supra note 13.
86. Id. at 124.
87. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 117 (citations omitted).
88. See id at 121 (noting "[o]ne's serious duty to pursue the truth about ultimates and
.").
to shape one's life in line with what one judges one has discovered about them ...
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distinguish his own theory, so I would like to say a few words about
Boyle's analysis of Dignitatis Humanae to distinguish them from that of
Finnis.90
Boyle provides the grist for the mill in his formulation of the "duty" of
the state toward religion. Simply put, he says that the negative duty not to
coerce creates the positive duty not to favor or disfavor any religion, or, for
that matter, to favor religion over irreligion. 9 1 In other words, "coercion"
equals "favoring." This nudge of the Council's teaching pushes it from
prohibition of state action to something that the state must do. It may seem
like two heads of the same coin, but a command not to favor is not
considered by the Council; even less did the Council consider that such
favor would have the unintended consequence of coercion. 9 2 The need for
the duty not to favor or disfavor any religion, in Boyle's view, arises from

89. Id. at 124-29.
90. Tomes have been written on the struggles with the Establishment Clause of the First
Amendment. See Lee v. Weisman, 505 U.S. 577, 592-99 (1992) (discussing the risk of
indirect coercion presented by prayer exercises in public schools); see also Lynch v.
Donnelly, 465 U.S. 668, 687-94 (1984) (O'Connor, J., concurring) (discussing government
"endorsement or disapproval" of religion as a direct infringement of the Establishment
Clause); Lemon v. Kurtzman, 403 U.S. 602, 612-13 (1971) (providing the following criteria
for determining whether government action unconstitutionally infringes on the
Establishment Clause: the government's action "must have a secular legislative purpose;"
must not have the primary effect of either advancing or inhibiting religion; and must not
'foster an excessive government entanglement with religion ") (emphasis added). None of
these cases is as effective as Dignitatis Humanae in describing what the role of the
government should .be. The Supreme Court's principles are derived from individual
disputes and provide only a flawed framework for future disputes, not principles for
governance.
91. See Joseph Boyle, The Place of Religion in the PracticalReasoning of Individuals
and Groups, 43 AM. J. JURIS. 1, 22 (1998) (explaining the role of political societies). Boyle
states:
Political society is morally obliged to create the social space for people to fulfill
their obligation to seek the truth in religious matters and live accordingly. It
cannot do this Wpolitical life is conducted as ifa certain outcome of this inquirywhether a particulartype of belief or nonbelief-were correct; for such political
action skews public life in ways that hinder rather than facilitate this inquiry, and
inevitably and unfairly coerces some to support actions whose rationales are
incompatible with deep elements in their worldviews. Rather, political society
must recognize that its proper actions cannot be based on any particular outcome
of this morally mandatory inquiry, since the correctness of any such outcome is
for individuals, families, and voluntary associations, not political societies, to
determine.
Id. (emphasis added).
92. See generally DignitatisHumanae,supra note 13.
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his conclusion that in order for the command of Dignitatis Humanae to
seek truth in religious matters to be fulfilled, people must be free from any
governmental position that there is a "correct" outcome to the inquiry. 9 3
Otherwise, the state does not create the "social space" for persons to carry
out their mandate. 9 4 This is the case, Boyle claims, because seeking the
truth can only be accomplished through individual and non-governmental
If this is true, we come back to our original question:
societal efforts.
what is the obligation of the government? Is doing nothing an adequate
position for a government for the well being of its citizens? Finnis breaks
with his colleague by asking two questions that lead to his ultimate
conclusion. First, he asks, is it is possible that governmental policies can
have a coercive effect on religious acts? 96 Second, does the favor resulting
from such policies involve the government in making judgments about
religion?9 7
Boyle would hold that the state must, in its defense of public order,
simply refrain from favoring a religion by intending to make a claim about
the tenets of that religion, even if the very act of public defense
presupposes the falsity of some part of what its adherents claim to
believe.9 8 This would suppress religious freedom, Boyle argues. 99 The
inevitable conclusion, undergirded by a fully secularist understanding of
religion, is that the negative duty to protect citizens from religious coercion
ends the state involvement in the matter, and there can be no positive duty
of the state toward true religion as true.' 00 Finnis rejects this outright, and I
find that Boyle's argument leaves one seeking more from the state in terms
of public recognition of religion as a vehicle for seeking truth.
A Case Study
In order to demonstrate the struggle for governmental neutrality, it
will be valuable to look at the Equality Act recently passed by the British
Parliament.o Section 52 of the British law begins, "[i]t is unlawful for a
public authority exercising a function to do any act which constitutes

93.
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.

Boyle, supranote 91, at 22.
See id
Id.
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 125.
Id.
Boyle, supra note 91, at 22-24.
See id.
Id.
Equality Act, 2006, c. 3 (Eng.).
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discrimination.,'1 02 The rest of that section of the Act enumerates
exemptions from the rule, most notably that of refusing entry visas to
religious leaders whose actions violate the public good.103 Public officials
are exempt, and the prohibition shall not apply to:
(g) a decision in connection with an application for entry clearance or for
leave to enter or remain in the United Kingdom or anything done for the
purposes of or in pursuance of a decision of that kind (whether or not the
decision is taken in pursuance of a provision of immigration rules) if the
decision is taken on the grounds(i) that a person holds an office or position in connection with a religion
or belief or provides services in connection with a religion or belief,
(ii) that a religion or belief is not to be treated in the same way as
certain other religions or beliefs, or
(iii) that the exclusion from the United Kingdom of a person to whom
paragraph (i) applies is conducive to the public good .... 104
Imagine a governmental decision that treats a religion differently
when one of its functionaries proclaims that the British Government should
submit to that religion and that all who do not believe and act upon this
should be forced to do so. This would violate British law.'0 5 Another
hypothetical could be a leader saying that those who speak disparagingly
against them or their prophet should be converted or killed. In such
scenarios, where someone is kept out of the country because acting upon
his religious beliefs would disrupt public order, the government is clearly
coercing a religious adherent for the public good. The common good is
protected through the maintenance of public order. This seems to be a
reasonable restriction considering the Council teaching to protect "the
rights of others and public peace." 06 The implication, however, is that the
government is necessarily making judgments about a particular religion,
about its very content, and, if it is in violation of British law, that it must be
considered false insofar as it violates the law. This is a powerful
implication that forms the bulwark of Finnis' desire to show that whether it
is a good idea or not, the state does and can make a positive determination
that a religion, if not false, is true.10 7 Finnis pulls no punches in arriving at
this conclusion:
102. Id. § 52(1).
103.
104.
105.
106.
107.

Id. § 52(4)(f)(i).
Id. § § 52(4)(g)(i)-(iii).
See id. § 52(1).
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 126.
Id.
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For it is a very grave degradation of public order and the temporal
common good that there has recently been imported into our polities

religious intimidation, extending perceptibly into the ope'rations of the
media, the academy, the writing of lectures such as this, and many other
institutions of national life. The exclusion or expulsion of those nonnationals who give open or covert or tacit support to the religious doctrines
and practices of intimidation is in principle compatible, I suggest, with the
true right to religious liberty.108
Finnis further bolsters his position by citing a House of Lords case in
which a claim against a state school that forbade certain forms of militant
Islamic attire was dismissed.109 The Lords argued that:
where Islam ... is socially influential even the option of wearing to school
or university a distinctively Muslim form of attire is regularly and
predictably the occasion and opportunity for intimidatory pressures,
and . . . state governments and laws and other public institutions are
accordingly entitled to exclude and forbid that sartorial exercise of religious
liberty, in order to preserve public order including the religious liberty of
others ... . 110
This reasoning by the House of Lords represents, in Finnis' eyes, a
legitimate conclusion when a religion and its content are being treated
differently from other religions. If we acknowledge religious liberty, those
who endanger the public good must be removed or repelled from
influencing and disturbing the community. Again, this is supported by the
notion that the belief that adversaries must be converted or killed is a
"standing incitement to violate the rights of others" and cannot be tolerated
in an ordered society."' This is difficult to swallow for many because the
identification of a line between carrying out these beliefs and simply
"believing" them is a difficult one to determine.
Obviously, this notion is not difficult to see if someone has been
assaulted or killed, but incitement to violence by those who have influence
over adherents of a religion is a real threat, and acting upon it is an exercise
in preventive social and political medicine that encounters fierce resistance
based upon the same principles that suppressed it in the first place. A
rational response to such suppression is rarely encountered. Rather, a
political upheaval or emotional appeal usually follows.

108. Id.
109. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 126 (citing R (Begum) v. Headteacher and
Governors of Denbigh High School [2006) UKHL 15, [32], [59]-[65], [91], [98]).
110. Id. at 126-27 (citing R (Begum), [2006] UKHL 15) (emphasis added).
111. Id. at 127.
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This is a side argument, but nonetheless one worth exploring briefly.
The argument goes as follows: beliefs of religions that foment acts that
violate the public good are just that-beliefs. Taking preemptive action
against those who profess those beliefs simply entrenches them in their
beliefs and, as is popularly said, "creates more terrorists." In other words,
if you eliminate those who want to carry out the violent beliefs but have not
done so yet, removing them from society precipitously, you incur wrath
and resentment, and you reinforce the resolve of others who have those
beliefs and want to carry them out. It is the "hydra" argument-cutting off
one head causes the growth of several more heads. The argument,
however, falls flat in its suggestion that any action against evil simply
creates more evil, that any attempt to correct or prevent error engenders
error. This is patently false. The true result in the order of being is that
such actions restore and protect the public good. It is not possible to tell
people that they cannot exercise their faith, but that they can simply believe
it. This would directly violate their religious liberty. Therefore, Finnis is
trying to demonstrate that the act of believing that disrupts the public good
can legitimately be rejected by a society through governmental action and
that this discrimination would not violate religious liberty, but would rather
enhance it.112
G.

The State Declaresa Religion To Be True

Not only does Finnis contend that there is no reason that the state
cannot make a judgment that a religion is true, but he argues that it has an
obligation to do so. 1 13 It would in fact be unjust not to make such a
determination. The argument has as its first premise that it is false to teach
that no religion is true-a falsity that when believed is harmful to
humanity. 1 14 Second, if state action causes people to believe that it holds
no religion as true, it has the obligation to correct this impression. 115 The
positive duty, then, is to "recognize and favour religion" as taught in the
112. Id. at 128. Finnis explains:
[T]he threat that some religious beliefs present to public order (essentially by
authorizing or inciting intimidation), and present in the longer term to the
constitutional order which enforces the right to religious liberty, may be such that
it is necessary to explicitly withhold from those beliefs the advantages that parity
with other religions, combined with the weight of numbers, would otherwise
require.
Id.
113. Id. at 128.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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DignitatisHumanae. This, Finnis believes, is the only way to counteract
the error that there is no true religion.' 17 By carrying out this duty, the state
also identifies the truth in those religions that-while not the fullness of the
true religion-still offer a medium for a fundamental truth: "there is a
transcendent source of being, intelligibility and value."' 1 8
This brings us to Finnis' conclusion that the state must name the true
religion.' 19 How did we get there? First, what are the concrete problems
regarding the state and religion in modem polities? Governments make
decisions that imply judgments about religion. 120 If a religion threatens
public order, however, a judgment is made about the validity of the beliefs
of that religion, and it is discriminated against. 12 1 This is the gist of the
British Equality Act with regard to immigration, and it can be applied to
education. 122 This is done not only for the sake of immediate public order
but also for the permanence of order in the society that must protect
religious liberty. The state is making judgments about religion.
Finnis considers that failing to make such judgments, choices, and
comparisons would have the consequence that the state is expressing a
teaching that no religion is true. 123 This, Finnis insists, is presumably
unjust if done intentionally by the state.124 "So," he concludes, "the
discrimination should presumptively be made, with all due care for
accuracy and procedural fairness." 2 5 If, therefore, the state is going to
determine that a religion is the true religion, the state must not "hold out as
true" a religion that is not the true religion-a negative obligation.126
Furthermore, once determined, the state must not make participation or
membership in the true religion mandatory for political office or for public
benefits.1 27 The state may, and must, however, disqualify those from office
whose religious group teaches that which is a threat to public order.12 8
Also, in identifying the true religion, the state must not encroach upon that
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.
123.
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 128-30.
Id. at 128.
Id. at 125-27.
See Equality Act, 2006, c. 3 (Eng.).
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 128.
Id. at 128-29.
Id. at 129.
Id.
Id.
Id.
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religion in any way by appointing officials or making judgments on its
ecclesial makeup. 129
Perhaps the most important point in Finnis' conclusion is that
legislators must take into account the teachings of the true religion in as
much as it affects the law and governance.' 30 This has a twofold
foundation. First that the teachings of the true religion must be followed
only to the extent they do not intend to offer particular answers to particular
problems on which they have no competence, or as Finnis puts it, "[it
cannot] depend upon premises which are essentially questions of present
fact and prediction of consequences . . . .,,131 This means not that moral
teaching does not apply, but that legislators must be able to access it
through philosophical inquiry. Theological reflection and divine revelation
simply confirm, add more credence to, or make clearer those moral
teachings. Furthermore, the true religion has an obligation to actively
maintain that access to the philosophical and analytical tools for accessing
the moral and, therefore, political teaching through education and scholarly
enterprises.132 Finnis' final point summarizes his entire theory. He regards
people declaring by name the identity of the true religion without an act of
faith as entirely congruous with philosophical inquiry, with revelation, with
divinely guided tradition, and with justice.13 3 This would not be something
done haphazardly but would be integral to the constitutional foundation of
the society. Needless to say, this could cause collateral damage, and Finnis
acknowledges as much.134 Concern for this damage might make it
imprudent to do so, but if it was done so that the adherents of the religion
would have to continuously maintain the philosophical, moral, and
historical connection to the polity, Finnis thinks it would be a workable
solution.' 35 In some sense, this is a toned down conclusion for the more
forceful premise that the state has the obligation to name the true religion.
The questions jump out. Once established, does a society create a
constitutional amendment to identify that religion? Does the indirect and
assumed truth of religion count for anything more than culture and
tradition? I think of the American founding, its Christian roots, the
Christian symbolism that permeated the public identity of the nation-from

129.
130.
131.
132.
133.
134.
135.

Id.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 130.
Id.
Id.
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the coining and printing of money to the ethical foundation of courts often
expressed in images of the Ten Commandments. As we know, the United
States Supreme Court has struggled with this in terms of its First
Amendment jurisprudence.' 36 Nonetheless, few would deny the Christian
complexion of the American founding, and it is a valid question if that
reality could or should be memorialized in constitutional form.
III. THE TEACHING OF THE CHURCH
Finnis draws his reader's thoughts to the not-so-subtle inference that
the Catholic Church should be identified, in the ordered state, as the true
religion. With such a determination supported by political-philosophical
inquiry, the logical conclusion is that Revelation and Church tradition and
history inform and direct human society on the level of the organized
community. Theological expression assists but is not necessary. We will
flesh this out by chronicling the development of doctrine on church-state
relations in major Church documents since the middle of the ninteenth
century. Our exposition will begin with the Syllabus Errorum (1864) of
Pius IX and move into the documents of Leo XIII with Immortali Dei
(1885) and then Libertas (1888), which was the most mature expression of
Leo XIII's thought in his macro-political-economic theory. We will then
look at the Encyclical Pacem in Terris of John XXII and, finally, at Fides
et Ratio of John Paul II.
A. Syllabus Errorum
The Syllabus contains what most people today would consider very
difficult teachings. Reason, according to Pius, must not be understood to
be self-sufficient as arbiter of truth or as the law that can provide for "the
welfare of men and of nations."137 The teachings taken in and of
themselves-and we will look at some of them in detail-seem to hinder
Finnis' philosophical theories which set aside, to a certain degree, theology
and doctrine. Are they reconcilable? If the anathemas are observed in the
context of the times and the continuity of the Church's experience
expressed through tradition, I believe it can be shown that Pius'
condemnations do support, to a large extent, the theory of Finnis. Where

136. Compare McCreary Cnty., v. ACLU of Ky., 545 U.S. 844 (2005) (holding that a
display of the Ten Commandments on a courthouse was unconstitutional), with Van Orden
v. Perry, 545 U.S. 677 (2005) (upholding as constitutional a monument with the Ten
Commandments inscribed upon it located on the Texas State Capitol Grounds).
137. Syllabus Errorum,supra note 14, 1 3.
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Finnis argues that the state can identify the true religion, and in doing so
can restrict the actions of religions that threaten public order, Pius would
not only be supportive, but goes further: "[I]t is false that the civil liberty of
every mode of worship, and the full power given to all of overtly and
publicly manifesting their opinions and their ideas, of all kinds whatsoever,
conduce more easily to corrupt the morals and minds of the people, and to
the propagation of the pest of indifferentism."' 3 8 Pius is not necessarily
speaking here about Islam and the teachings to kill those who will not
convert, as Finnis suggested, 13 9 but is discussing public expressions of the
acceptance of immorality and speech that erodes the faith of believers. I
think that Finnis would not reject this notion if damaging the faith of
believers could be equated with disturbing the public order.
In this teaching, Pius is following the notion that the state has an
obligation to encourage the good and identify what is true. He rejects,
however, the civil notion of the separation of church and state: It cannot be
held that "[i]n the present day, it is no longer expedient that the Catholic
religion shall be held as the only religion of the State, to the exclusion of all
other modes of worship,"l 4 0 while likewise rejecting: "Whence it has been
wisely provided by law, in some countries called Catholic, that persons
coming to reside therein shall enjoy the public exercise of their own
worship."l 4 1 In other words, he is rejecting freedom of religious worship.
For Pius, rejecting these ideas was an attempt to quell religious strife
resulting from new strands of philosophy becoming concrete in political
conflict. Finnis, on the other hand, is concerned not with exposing error
but with laying out the positive duties of the state regarding the identity of
truth.142 It is fair to say that Finnis' theory is complimentary to the
teaching of Pius. Finnis is the "half-full" portion, and Pius the "halfempty."
Pius focuses not only on issues affecting civil life directly but brings
together his teachings on the relationship of faith and reason. Whereas
Finnis absorbs revelation into philosophy without the need for theology,
Pius' teaching, while not contrary, rejects rationalism and godless
philosophy: It is anathema believing that "[h]uman reason, without any

138. Id, 79.
139. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 125-26.
140. Syllabus Errorum,supra note 14, T 77.
141. Id. 78.
142. This is not the place to explain the Magisterium, the magisterial teaching of Pius,
and what level of assent Catholics must give to these teachings, but it should at least be said
that they are not considered to be dogmatic teachings of the Church.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol35/iss1/1

24

Wagner: The Obligation of Government Toward Humanity: The Role of the Sta

2012]

OBLIGATION OF GOVERNMENT TOWARD HUMANITY

25

regard to God, is the sole arbiter of truth and falsehood, of good and evil; it
is its own law to itself, and suffices by its natural force to secure the
welfare of men and of nations."l43 And again, it is anathema that "[a]ll the
truths of religion are derived from the native strength of human reason;
whence reason is the master rule by which man can and ought to arrive at
the knowledge of all truths of every kind." 144 Interestingly, even though
Finnis wants to avoid theology, as we pointed out in the first section of this
paper, he brings in "non-theological" revelation by offering two
philosophical proofs for the existence of God 4 5 and concludes that:
it is reasonable to hypothesize and anticipate that there might at some time
be some projection, to us, of meaning and shareable purpose, from the
infinitely greater intelligence and purposiveness needed to explain the
existence of our universe including our own mysterious but commonplace
sharing with each other of meaning and intentions.146
This, he says, does not "consign us to theology."l 47 Revelation, therefore,
comes into his theory by a side door, and Finnis' theory survives even the
harshest anathemas of Pius IX, especially the directly relevant: it is
anathema that "[p]hilosophy must be treated of without any account being
taken of supernatural revelation."148
Another conclusion of Finnis echoed in Pius IX's teaching is that the
state cannot intrude upon the Church's authority to name bishops and

143. Syllabus Errorum, supra note 14, 3.
144. Id. 4.
145. Finnis rejects the notion that it is unreasonable to posit a divine being and once
proven, it is also not unreasonable to argue that the divine being would communicate with
human beings:
Many people assume, and some hold with argument and tenacity, that in an
enquiry pursued intelligently and without bias any such transcendent source of
reality and value is no more than, at most, a bare possibility. They treat as
ungrounded and altogether improbable any anticipation or judgment that there has
been or may well be some such communication-revelation-from such a source.
But the question whether the existence and character of our universe give cogent
reason for affirming the existence of such a transcendent explanation is a
philosophical question, and one which cannot reasonably and philosophically be
given an answer without considering, carefully and with openness, the arguments
supporting such an affirmation. They are philosophical arguments, and stronger
than many an argument, in many a field of philosophy, that is widely thought
philosophically acceptable and warranted.
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 107.
146. Id. at 108-09.
147. Id. at 109.
148. Syllabus Errorum,supra note 14, 14.
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officials. 149 Pius IX rejects the notion that "[t]he secular authority
possesses, as inherent in itself, the right of presenting bishops, and may
require of them that they take possession of their dioceses before having
received canonical institution and the apostolic letters from the Holy
See."'so Pius IX also rejects the position that "the secular government has
the right of deposing bishops from their pastoral functions, and it is not
bound to obey the Roman Pontiff in those things which relate to episcopal
It is not as difficult as we first
sees and the institution of bishops."''
suspected to reconcile Finnis' theory and the anathemas of Pius IX.
Another way of putting the distinction between the two is this-as Pius
calls out error, Finnis provides the remedy.
B.

Immortale Dei

In 1885, Pope Leo XIII issued an encyclical, Immortale Dei, which
took up the defense of the Church in the face of criticism that She is
opposed to well regulated and progressively governed states and that, in
any case, the Church has nothing to offer them for the advance their
rightful aims.1 52 This document is an apologetic for the Church's
participation and relevance in civil society. In his previous encyclical,
53
Leo XIII was on the offensive against error; in Immortale
Aeterni Patris,1
Dei, the crux is a defense against the counterattack that rejected the Church
in favor of communistic and socialistic philosophies.
Leo XIII understood the nature of order and human existence and the
structure of reality with God as Author of all. As creatures of God, man
lives to return to God and human society exists to assist in that effort.
Societal governance, therefore, gets its authority to act from God himself.
Their obligation is not simply to act in a "moral" manner, but to explicitly
assist man in attaining his final end. Furthermore, since religion is the
means for man to achieve his end, the state must actively protect religion,
not simply allow it to exist. As Leo XIII explained:
All who rule, therefore, would hold in honor the holy name of God, and
one of their chief duties must be to favor religion, to protect it, to shield it

149. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 129.
150. Syllabus Errorum,supra note 14, 1 50.
151. Id. 5 1.
152. Immortale Dei, supra note 15.
153. Pope Leo XIII, Encyclical Letter, Aeterni Patris(1879) [hereinafter Aeterni Patris],
http://www.vatican.va/holyfather/leoxiiilencyclicals/documents/hf 1-xiii enc 04081879
aeterni-patrisen.html.
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under the credit and sanction of the laws, and neither to organize nor enact
any measure that may compromise its safety.154
This is the "negative duty" that Finnis would identify, and it protects
individuals from religious coercion.'s This is just the beginning for Leo
XIII, however, since that "negative duty" is accompanied by the positive
duty because it merely corroborates reality. He looks to his predecessor,
who saw the same problem:
Gregory XVI in his encyclical letter Mirari Vos, dated August 15, 1832,
inveighed with weighty words against the sophisms which even at his time
were being publicly inculcated-namely, that no preference should be shown
for any particular form of worship; that it is right for individuals to form
their own personal judgments about religion ... .156
Not only is there an obligation on the part of the state to protect and
promote religion, but also to identify religions in a hierarchical fashion
with the true religion over all:
Again, that it is not lawful for the State, any more than for the individual,
either to disregard all religious duties or to hold in equal favour different
kinds of religion; that the unrestrained freedom of thinking and of openly
making known one's thoughts is not inherent in the rights of citizens, and is
by no means to be reckoned worthy of favour and support.1 57
This is a difficult teaching in light of our modem sensibilities and the
notion of "freedom of speech" and the repugnance to the "establishment of
religion" so constantly prominent in modem America. Would Finnis
bristle at the prohibition from any open expression of "unrestrained
freedom of thinking"? The answer appears to be no as it seems to be
reconcilable with Finnis' notion of "public order."'" 8 If a religions leader is
preaching that infidels must be brought under submission by force or incur
death, such speech threatens public order and the state could and must
intervene. To prohibit thinking is difficult, but thinking without expression
through word or deed is nothing. Therefore, once this thinking becomes
public, it must be suppressed to protect others from religious coercion. Leo
XIII's language may seem harsh, but applied to a genuine circumstance, it
falls neatly into Finnis' theory-or, should we say, Finnis again maneuvers
through Church teaching unscathed. Leo XIII goes a bit further than what

154. Immortale Dei, supranote 15, J 6.
155. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 124.
156. Immortale Dei, supra note 15, 1 34.

157. Id.T35.
158. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 122.
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Finnis proposes, but I think in the examples that Finnis uses, Leo XIII's
notion identifying truth in religion would not sink Finnis' theory:
Since, then, no one is allowed to be remiss in the service due to God, and
since the chief duty of all men is to cling to religion in both its reaching and
practice-not such religion as they may have a preference for, but the
religion which God enjoins, and which certain and most clear marks show
to be the only one true religion-it is a public crime to act as though there
were no God. 159

Is irreligion a public crime? Would Finnis accept this? It does not
look as if Finnis would go quite this far. I would argue that while human
perfection entails the search for truth by a person, and that engaging in that
search through religion is the most efficacious way to undergird a properly
functioning society, it is a free search and must be treated as such. Finnis
would find acts of religious speech that were oppressive to be worthy of
state action, but he is not proposing a theocracy and compelled religiosity.
Leo XIII, however, goes further:
And it is a part of this [erroneous] theory that all questions that concern
religion are to be referred to private judgment; that every one is to be free
to follow whatever religion he prefers, or none at all if he disapprove of all.
From this the -following consequences logically flow: that the judgment of
each one's conscience is independent of all law; that the most unrestrained
opinions may be openly expressed as to the practice or omission of divine
worship; and that every one has unbounded license to think whatever he
chooses and to publish abroad whatever he thinks. 160
At first glance, Leo XIII comes off as an autocrat, but looking more
closely, the actions questioned are the public manifestations of error and
falsehood, which are coercive. Furthermore, we can see that neither is he
agitating for a catholic theocracy. In the teaching, "it is a public crime to
act as though there were no God,"16 ' Leo XIII's focus is on the "act." The
act is a public manifestation, and he would consider that to be coercion
against the religious. Leo XIII does not even reject the notion that people
are free to express themselves but that it must be done in truth:
So, too, the liberty of thinking, and of publishing, whatsoever each one
likes, without any hindrance, is not in itself an advantage over which
society can wisely rejoice. On the contrary, it is the fountain-head and
origin of many evils. Liberty is a power perfecting man, and hence should

159. Immortale Dei, supra note 15,
160. Id.

1 6 (emphasis added).

26.

161. Id. 6.
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have truth and goodness for its object. But the character of goodness and
truth cannot be changed at option. 2

"In itself' is a very important qualifier here that identifies liberty or
thinking critically as good while observing that there are limits that must be
observed. 163 But is it only the act? Some might accuse Leo XIII of
attempting mind control and inhibiting individual freedom even to think:
The Church of Christ is the true and sole teacher of virtue and guardian of
morals. She it is who preserves in their purity the principles from which
duties flow, and, by setting forth most urgent reasons for virtuous life, bids

us not only to turn away from wicked deeds, but even to curb all
movements of the mind that are opposed to reason, even though they be not
carriedout in action.164

This is another very difficult teaching. Here, however, he is speaking
of the duties of the Church. The state cannot control thinking, but-to be
sure-the Church identifies evil and sin in the minds and hearts of men.
Our Lord himself repeatedly called out those whose sin was hidden deep
inside, "You have heard that it was said, 'Do not commit adultery.' But I
say to you, everyone who looks at a woman with lust has already
committed adultery with her in his heart."l 6 5 The Church's primary
function is the salvation of souls. The state does not have this duty, but as
part of the created order, it has the obligation to assist in this, for all men
were made for God. It is only natural that the institutions of men would, in
the end, serve this purpose as well.
It is important to remember that Finnis' theory does not expressly
limit the notion of "protection from coercion" to an understanding that
would affect or control only the government.166 The preaching of
162. Id. 32 (emphasis added).
163. There is also an underlying theme here that comes from the teaching of St.
Augustine continued by St. Thomas and treated specifically by Leo XIII in Libertas.
Namely, that Augustine identified freedom with truth and slavery with falsehood. Entering
into error, committing sin, and turning away from God is necessarily a restriction on liberty.
The fullness of freedom and liberty is in following the will of God. Openness to the truth is
endangered when we follow error, and therefore this must be avoided. Leo XIII is taking
this one step further saying that these actions in the name of liberty are actually a move
away from freedom and must be curbed. See id. 32. In other words, if individuals are
falling into sinful thoughts about governance, rejecting divine authority, the state has an
obligation to reject such error and protect others from falling into the same error. The state
is not trying to protect against sin qua sin, but against the institutional corruption that comes
from individuals' derailments from truth and reality.
164. Id. (emphasis added).
165. Matthew 5:27-28.
166. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 121.
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irreligion, as well as active oppression, by individuals or religious groups
perhaps fit even more snugly into Finnis' theory that all must be first
protected from coercion. Protection is not where his theory ends, however.
As we have seen, Finnis' goal is to identify the true religion and do so
through philosophical inquiry. The most important aspect of that is the
inclusion of revelation through historical and philosophical reflection.'6 7
Leo XIII also considers revelation as the centerpiece to identifying the true
religion and gives examples first from historical sources:
Now, it cannot be difficult to find out which is the true religion, if only it
be sought with an earnest and unbiased mind; for proofs are abundant and
striking. We have, for example, the fulfilment [sic] of prophecies, miracles
in great numbers, the rapid spread of the faith in the midst of enemies and
in face of overwhelming obstacles, the witness of the martyrs, and the like.
From all these it is evident that the only true religion is the one established
by Jesus Christ Himself, and which He committed to His Church to protect
and to propagate.168
For both authors, reason cannot be divorced from the historical, nor
from revelation. Finnis understands that separating reason from the
equation or refusing to allow religious doctrine into the discussion is to
fatally derail the investigation-"religion is contrasted with reason," or
"philosophy is neutral," or religion is simply a right like any other used to
"define oneself' are all methods to relegate religion to the realm of the
"unreasonable."' 6 9
It should also be noted that understanding the
relationship between reason and religion is not the same as using
theological arguments to prove religious truth. Finnis makes it clear that
using the claims of religion, which can be shown historically and proven
philosophically, is not the same as using dogmatic teachings of religion or
fideism.17 0
Leo XIII too identifies reason as complimentary, and, where Finnis
presents philosophy as clarified and supported by theology, Leo XIII sees
reason as complimentary and supporting of religious truth in society:
"Such, then, as We have briefly pointed out, is the Christian organization of
civil society; not rashly or fancifully shaped out, but educed from the

167. Id. at 114 ("Our reflections will go soundly if they treat affirming God as within the
full reach of the critically disciplined reasoning we call philosophy, and treat affirming the
political common good (including politically acknowledged human rights) as within the full
reach of critically disciplined practical reason at its highest: political philosophy.").
168. Immortale Dei, supra note 15, 17.
169. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 111 (citation omitted).
170. See id. at 114.
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highest and truest principles, confirmed by natural reason itself,"' 71 and,
again, "[n]ow, natural reason itself proves convincingly that [erroneous]
concepts of the government of a State are wholly at variance with the truth.
Nature itself bears witness that all power, of every kind, has its origin from
God, who is its chief and most august source." 72 Truth is not relative, and
this realty is identified in Leo XIII's understanding of the structure of
mankind. Although he does not attribute the authority of the state to God
directly, reason educed from true principles is the foundation for Finnis'
conclusion that the state can identify the true religion.' 7 3
C. Libertas
Libertas,174 dealing in a multivalent way with human freedom, is the
last relevant encyclical of Pope Leo XIII before the famous Rerum
Novarum. Libertas, however, focused not on systems of government, but
on the human person, his individual salvation, and, consequently, the
participation of the state in that salvation. I say multivalent because, from
the beginning, Leo XIII recognizes that there is the initial freedom to act
followed by true freedom experienced when following the will of God."'
In his earlier writings, he had emphasized truth and reality, whereas here he

171. Immortale Dei, supra note 15, 16.
172. Id. 30.
173. Does Finnis simply promote the remedy of a revelation-based legalized identity of
the true religion? Is that the solution to what Leo XIII is lamenting as a turn from the divine
and collapse into error? Or does Finnis in different words insist that revelation be brought
into the "non-religious" conversation, a conversation which Leo XIII seemingly rejects by
pointing out all the ways that truth is suppressed:
The authority of God is passed over in silence, just as if there were no God; or
as if He cared nothing for human society; or as if men, whether in their individual
capacity or bound together in social relations, owed nothing to God; or as if there
could be a government of which the whole origin and power and authority did not
reside in God Himself. Thus, as is evident, a State becomes nothing but a
multitude which is its own master and ruler. And since the people is declared to
contain within itself the spring-head of all rights and of all power, it follows that
the State does not consider itself bound by any kind of duty toward God.
Moreover, it believes that it is not obliged to make public profession of any
religion; or to inquire which of the very many religions is the only one true; or to
prefer one religion to all the rest; or to show to any form of religion special
favour; but, on the contrary, is bound to grant equal rights to every creed, so that
public order may not be disturbed by any particular form of religious belief.
Id. 125.
174. Libertas, supra note 16.
175. Id. T 1.
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begins reinforcing the notion that each person has a free will to choose
good or evil.176
This greater emphasis on the distinction between the freedom to act
and true freedom, which comes from following the will of God, enables
Leo XIII to address how natural law is connected to eternal law, making it
perfect and engendering freedom. It also provides Leo XIII the opportunity
to explain how human law has no such direct connection to truth but must
be so connected by men: "The precepts, therefore, of the natural law,
contained bodily in the laws of men, have not merely the force of human
law, but they possess that higher and more august sanction which belongs
to the law of nature and the eternal law."1 7 7 Due to this distinction, the
obligation of those who govern society is not only the negative duty to
protect individuals from threats to public order, but also the positive duty to
protect the state itself from error, with the goal of tuming men toward the
good. Leo XIII insists:
[W]ithin the sphere of this kind of laws the duty of the civil legislator is,
mainly, to keep the community in obedience by the adoption of a common
discipline and by putting restraint upon refractory and viciously inclined
men, so that, deterred from evil, they may turn to what is good, or at any
rate may avoid causing trouble and disturbance to the State.
We again see that the alignment of Finnis' theory to Church teaching
is remarkably close. Finnis argues not that the state's purpose is to turn
men toward the good, but that, in protecting citizens from coercion and
identifying the true religion, the goal is the common good.'7 9 Finnis argues
that:
Taking common good in its widest extension, it is for the common good of
the members of a political community that they find the truth about divine
creation and redemption, live in accordance with that truth, and so enter

176. Id. Leo XIII makes this distinction between the possible choices by stating:
But the manner in which [liberty] is exercised is of the greatest moment, inasmuch
as on the use that is made of liberty the highest good and the greatest evil alike
depend. Man, indeed, is free to obey his reason, to seek moral good, and to strive
unswervingly after his last end. Yet he is free also to turn aside to all other things;
and, in pursuing the empty semblance of good, to disturb rightful order and to fall
headlong into the destruction which he has voluntarily chosen.
Id.
177. Id. T 9.
178. Id.
179. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 122.
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fellowship of the divine

Here, the use corresponds neatly with Finnis' use of common good and
protection from the evil of coercion. Using the different categories enables
Finnis to argue against the need for faith-based acceptance of divine
revelation and theology to make his point.
Leo XIII uses Thomistic philosophy to describe how the human
intellect works. In doing so, he contends that reason directs the will. 18 2
Reason informs judgment. Therefore, reason is the source of truth. Reason
then, instantiated in society, is law.1 8 3 Furthermore, since reason has its
source in truth, which is God, natural law is the same as eternal law
implanted in the rational creature which, when assisted by grace,
strengthens and orders the human will.184 Finnis avoids the teaching of
"grace" and would consider it a part of religious faith that is unnecessary
for the philosophical inquiry into the true religion.' 85 Leo XIII's approach
is theological, for grace is a purely theological concept. Instead, for Finnis,
it is the historical and philosophical acceptance of the reasonableness of
revelation that informs the reason. The conclusions, nevertheless, are
similar. Leo XIII sees that human law must manifest the eternal law.
When it doesn't, chaos arises out of an individualistic notion of "everyone
for himself!" Leo XIII concludes:

180. Id.
181. Id. It is worth mentioning that it is not beyond Finnis' analysis to use church
teaching but identify it as philosophical reasoning. He makes this very presumption
regarding Dignitatis Humanae when he argues that the use of natural law reflects the
constitutional use of positive law in that there is no assumption of atheism. Id.
182. See Libertas, supra note 16, 1 7 ("[T]he reason prescribes to the will what it should
seek after or shun .... ).
183. Id. Leo XIII explains:
This ordination of reason is called law. In man's free will, therefore, or in the
moral necessity of our voluntary acts being in accordance with reason, lies the
very root of the necessity of law. Nothing more foolish can be uttered or
conceived than the notion that, because man is free by nature, he is therefore
exempt from law. Were this the case, it would follow that to become free we must
be deprived of reason; whereas the truth is that we are bound to submit to law
precisely because we are free by our very nature. For, law is the guide of man's
actions; it turns him toward good by its rewards, and deters him from evil by its
punishments.
Id.
184. Id. 8.
185. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 109.
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Therefore, the true liberty of human society does not consist in every man
doing what he pleases, for this would simply end in turmoil and confusion,
and bring on the overthrow of the State; but rather in this, that through the
injunctions of the civil law all may more easily conform to the prescriptions
of the eternal law.' 86
For Leo XIII, the goal is the eternal law. For Finnis, the goal is public
order, and the common good that ensues is, in fact, directed toward eternal
life.18 7 What is complimentary is that while the final goal for Leo XIII is
salvation, the final goal for Finnis is public order and the avoidance of
error. Finnis posits:
First, then, the main strands of my reflections entail that the state's
government and law cannot justly teach that no religion is true[.] For such
a teaching would be false, and false on a matter closely affecting a basic
aspect of human wellbeing. And if a state does not teach that but its
arrangements give rise, as a side-effect, to widespread belief that the state's
government has adopted them because it holds that no religion is true, the
government has a significant duty to do what it reasonably can [sic] rebut
that inference.188
Finnis pulls up short of giving the state a role in the eternal life of the
human soul because he cannot do it exclusively within philosophical
inquiry. It would require theological analysis, and he is reluctant to add
anything that could make his work appear as disguised religious faith. For
Leo XIII, it is not difficult to come to a supernatural conclusion using
philosophy and reason when the truth of salvation is about all of human
society and God's creation, and all together it serves eternal life. The only
reason I can see for Finnis' hesitation is that he does not want to venture
into the territory of the immortal soul. Finnis would undoubtedly argue
that such is the realm of the Church proper and has nothing directly to do
with the state. But if the state is directing its citizens to the true religion, is
that not the same as providing assistance to one's salvation? If you prevent
less-than-true religions from coercing citizens, are you not creating an

186. Libertas,supra note 16, 10.
187. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 122. Finnis is explicit about the purpose of
securing public order:
Taking common good in its widest extension, it is for the common good of the
members of a political community that they find the truth about divine creation
and redemption, live in accordance with that truth, and so enter and remain for
ever in the altogether fulfilling fellowship of the divine family extending from this
world into eternity.
Id.
188. Id. at 128.
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environment in which you are assisted in your quest for salvation? Leo
XIII would certainly say so.'" 9 I believe Finnis would too, but would do so
using different language, the language of the common good, which "might
include salvation."19 0
Finnis argues for the obligation, and, therefore, the authority of the
state to identify the true religion by name because the human being was
created to engage in the search for truth.19' This foundational principle
employed in his theory comes from the Dignitatis Humanae.192 Let's
revisit the two main arguments, as they are critical to the Finnis theory.
First, "everyone has a moral obligation to seek the truth about religious
matters, and adhere to whatever truth one finds." 9 3 Second, "one cannot
live up to that obligation in a manner appropriate to one's nature as a
rational and responsible person unless one has immunity from external
coercion as well as psychological freedom." 9 4 If everyone has the
obligation to seek the truth, the state must provide the environment in
which to seek it. Finnis identifies these points in the Dignitatis Humanae
as a philosophical argument' 95 This conclusion is supported by the notion
that it is not unreasonable to use Church teaching in philosophical inquiry
that is not, in the strictest sense, faith-grounded. Nonetheless, it seems that
Finnis presents an argument that continues to follow Church teaching
closely.
The notion of human liberty in Finnis' theory (that is precisely the
teaching of Dignitatis Humanae) is the obligation to seek the truth and
protection from coercion. Finnis does not see any coercion in identifying
the true religion. Nor does Leo XIII see any curtailment of freedom by
insisting on the Church's understanding of true liberty in the eternal law:
If when men discuss the question of liberty they were careful to grasp its
true and legitimate meaning, such as reason and reasoning have just
explained, they would never venture to affix such a calumny on the Church
as to assert that she is the foe of individual and public liberty.196

189. See Libertas, supra note 16, T 21 ("[Y]et, in [professing one true religion], [the
state] ought not to diminish, but rather to increase, man's capability of attaining to the
supreme good in which his everlasting happiness consists . . .
190. Religion andState, supra note 5, at 122.
191. Id. at 130.
192. Id. at 117.
193. Id.(discussing the DignitatisHumanae) (internal quotation marks omitted).
194. Id. (internal quotation marks omitted).
195. Id. at 117-18.
196. Libertas, supra note 16, 14.
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Leo XIII identifies hostility to any authority as the reason some will not
follow the truth.197 Finnis would, I believe, agree with this. In his criticism
of Ronald Dworkin, Finnis identifies as error the thought that no authority
can decide anything for one:
Or again [the discussion of religion and state derails] if, as Ronald Dworkin
says, the basis of the First Amendment's guarantee of religious freedom is
simply that "no one can regard himself as a free and equal member of an
organized venture that claims authority to decide for him what he thinks
self-respect requires him to decide for himself."l 98
Hostility to authority, therefore, makes it impossible to have a common
foundation on which to base a meaningful discussion. Leo XIII considers
the derailment a result of "liberals" following the footsteps of Lucifer, but
the result itself about the impossibility to proceed in truth is identical.1 99
Finnis sees the First Amendment's prohibition on the "establishment
of religion" as problematic and does not delve into it.2 00 Leo XIII, on the
other hand, rejects the notion of a separation between church and state as
absurd. 2 0 ' How can a society, which gets its authority from God by nature,
not provide the environment for individuals to live according to the laws of
God? 20 2 Leo XIII writes that it is impossible for there to be a controversy
197. See id. 14 ("But many there are who follow in the footsteps of Lucifer, and adopt
as their own his rebellious cry, 'I will not serve'; and consequently substitute for true liberty
what is sheer and most foolish license.").
198. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 112 (emphasis added) (citation omitted).
199. Libertas, supra note 16, 14.
200. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 128.
201. Libertas,supra note 16, 18.
202. There is so much in this paragraph I am tempted to reprint it in toto. I will resist
that but provide a rich excerpt that summarizes Leo XHtt's forceful argument that the
Church cannot be seen as a reality conflicting with the state:
There are others . . . who affirm that the morality of individuals is to be guided
by the divine law, but not the morality of the State, for that in public affairs the
commands of God may be passed over, and may be entirely disregarded in the
framing of laws. Hence follows the fatal theory of the need of separation between
Church and State. .. . Nature herself proclaims the necessity of the State providing
means and opportunities whereby the community may be enabled to live properly,
that is to say, according to the laws of God. For, since God is the source of all
goodness and justice, it is absolutely ridiculous that the State should pay no
attention to these laws .

. .

. Besides, those who are in authority owe it to the

commonwealth not only to provide for its external well-being and the
conveniences of life, but still more to consult the welfare of men's souls in the
wisdom of their legislation. . . . And, what is still more important, and what We
have more than once pointed out, although the civil authority has not the same
proximate end as the spiritual, nor proceeds on the same lines, nevertheless in the
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because church and state are complimentary and part of a whole which is
the created society of mankind:
From this teaching, as from its source and principle, flows that fatal
principle of the separation of Church and State; whereas it is, on the

contrary, clear that the two powers, though dissimilar in functions and
unequal in degree, ought nevertheless to live in concord, by harmony in
their action and the faithful discharge of their respective duties.203

For Leo XIII, state and church are like body and soul-one cannot exist
without the other. Finnis makes no such dramatic analogies, but, instead,
recognizes the obligation to search for truth with the state providing the
temporal door through which one can exercise that duty.
Leo XII's arguments compellingly foreshadow a philosophical theory
supporting Church teaching. In this passage, Leo XIII rejects freedom that
would support a state position that there was no true religion:
This kind of liberty, if considered in relation to the State, clearly implies

that there is no reason why the State should offer any homage to God, or
should desire any public recognition of Him; that no one form of worship is
to be preferred to another, but that all stand on an equal footing, no account
being taken of the religion of the people, even if they profess the Catholic
faith. But, to justify this, it must needs be taken as true that the State has no
duties toward God, or that such duties, if they exist, can be abandoned with
impunity, both of which assertions are manifestly false. For it cannot be
doubted but that, by the will of God, men are united in civil society;
whether its component parts be considered; or its form, which implies

authority; or the object of its existence; or the abundance of the vast
services which it renders to man.204

It is a simple, yet powerful argument-in order to conclude that the
state must be separated from the Church, one must accept the false premise
that the state has no obligation to God. This is impossible. God created
society so that man could be assisted in the journey of his own salvation.
Eden was the same. Eve was created to help Adam. Simple. Even
stronger support for Finnis' theory that the state must identify the true
religion is Leo XII's argument that the state exists for the welfare of its

exercise of their separate powers they must occasionally meet. ... This harmony
has been not inaptly compared to that which exists between the body and the soul
for the well-being of both one and the other, the separation of which brings
irremediable harm to the body, since it extinguishes its very life.
Id.
203. Id. 38.

204. Id. 21.
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citizens. In carrying out this duty, it must "increase man's capability of
attaining to the supreme good," which is everlasting happiness.20 5
It is necessary to speak about freedom of speech. As Finnis has
argued, speech that incites people to violence against others cannot stand
since it is oppressive and coercive. Leo XIII's language is much stronger,
saying simply that there is no such right "if it be not used in moderation,
and if it pass beyond the bounds .. . of all true liberty."206 If this is true,
then it supports Finnis' example of curtailing the speech of the one
preaching death to infidels when they won't convert.20 7 If you think of this
preacher coercing others to follow his teaching, a teaching that threatens
public order, it becomes evident how such a leader is precisely the person
whom Leo XIII says must be silenced. Consider this description of
religious oppression:
The excesses of an unbridled intellect, which unfailingly end in the
oppression of the untutored multitude, are no less rightly controlled by the
authority of the law than are the injuries inflicted by violence upon the
weak. And this all the more surely, because by far the greater part of the
community is either absolutely unable, or able only with great difficulty, to
escape from illusions and deceitful subtleties, especially such as flatter the
passions. If unbridled license of speech and of writing be granted to all,
nothing will remain sacred and inviolate; even the highest and truest
mandates of natures, justly held to be the common and noblest heritage of
the human race, will not be spared. 208
The human race depends upon controlling those who control others
through flattery and oppression. Does Finnis disagree? If the leaders of a
religion that taught its followers to kill the infidels were left to their
devices, the danger would be apparent. Intellectually, there are those who
205. Id. 21. He further states explicitly the duty to identify the one true religion:
Wherefore, civil society must acknowledge God as its Founder and Parent, and
must obey and reverence His power and authority. Justice therefore forbids, and
reason itself forbids, the State to be godless; or to adopt a line of action which
would end in godlessness-namely, to treat the various religions (as they call
them) alike, and to bestow upon them promiscuously equal rights and privileges.
Since, then, the profession of one religion is necessary in the State, that religion
must be professed which alone is true, and which can be recognized without
difficulty ..

.

. This religion, therefore, the rulers of the State must preserve and

protect, if they would provide-as they should do-with prudence and usefulness
for the good of the community.
Id.
206. Id. 123.
207. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 125-26.
208. Libertas, supra note 16, T 23.
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"poison the root of the tree" 209 by rejecting revelation in religion itself,
making religion an empty shell no longer capable of being involved in
human affairs: "A religion that remained at peace with such incoherence
would drop below the horizon of philosophy, and could not claim the
adherence of any earnestly enquiring mind. It would fail to live up to the
demands of public reason." 210 Finnis sees the problem as fatal both in
action and in mind-in action because the "infidels," namely Christians,
would be wiped out, and in mind because true religion would be weakened
while the pathway to truth would be obscured by intellectual
manipulation.2 1'
D. Pacem in Terris
As we arrive upon the tumultuous scene of the late mid-twentieth
century before the Second Vatican Council, Pope John XXIII takes a
decidedly different approach in dealing with church-state relations. Gone
are the vitriolic attacks or various forms of political and philosophical
error, replaced by a softer critique focused less on intellectual aberrations
and more on a full understanding of authority. The language used by the
Pope is less dramatic and caustic and reflects a style more akin to what we
expect and are comfortable with today. Because of this, there are
remarkable similarities between this Pope's arguments and that of Finnis.
For Finnis, public or political authority is constitutional, and the duty of the
government is derived from those who they must serve, not from its
source. 2 12 For all the popes and the consistent teaching of the Church,

209. Religion and State, supra note 5.at 115.
210. Id. at 116.
211. In the following paragraph, Leo Xii is not only explicit about free speech, but
specifies that teachers must be prevented from teaching these erroneous notions of freedom:
[I]t is plainly the duty of all who teach to banish error from the mind, and by sure
safeguards to close the entry to all false convictions. From this it follows, as is
evident, that the liberty of which We have been speaking is greatly opposed to
reason, and tends absolutely to pervert men's minds, in as much as it claims for
itself the right of teaching whatever it pleases-a liberty which the State cannot
grant without failing in its duty.
Libertas,supra note 16, 1 24.
212. Finnis does not identify the source exactly (because I think he would consider the
authority divine), but rather the "system," which-if it is fair-can properly carry out its
duties and presumably identify the true religion. "These questions can be answered well by
considering first a society in which adherents of sound philosophy, both political/moral and
religious, have procedurally fair and constitutional authority to settle the laws and their
execution." Religion and State, supra note 5, at 116. He goes even further and gives the
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human society cannot function without legal authority, and that authority
comes from God.213 Moreover, the state participates in the authority of
God, as it is part of the order of being. John XXIII looks to his
predecessor, Pius XII, to find the words to express this concept, along with
the assertion that this order is not arrived at simply by religious faith, but is
made clear by "right reason":
The absolute order of living beings, and the very purpose of man-an
autonomous being, the subject of duties and inviolable rights, and the
origin and purpose of human society-have a direct bearing upon the State
as a necessary community endowed with authority. Divest it of this
authority, and it is nothing, it is lifeless . ...

But right reason, and above

all Christian faith, make it clear that such an order can have no other origin
but in God, a personal God, our Creator. Hence it is from Him that State
officials derive their dignity, for they share to some extent in the authority
of God Himself. 214
This teaching parallels the theory of Finnis. As we have said, Finnis
sees the relationship between the state and religion as the former providing
the latter with an ordered, temporal environment that in turn allows for
religion to accomplish its ends of eternal life.2 15 Finnis is not talking about

United States Constitution the place of a "civilizational core" but still does not identify its
source of authority when he posits:
Philosophically assessed, without the philosophically unsound presupposition
of atheism or agnosticism about creation and revelation, the natural law thesis
articulated in Dignitatis Humanae, like its positive law antecedents in the U.S.
Constitution and the European Convention on Human Rights, constitutes a sound
and true civilizational core. It is a centering pole between unsound secularist and
theocratic alternatives.
Id. at 122.
213. As recognized by Pope John XXllI:
Human society can be neither well-ordered nor prosperous without the
presence of those who, invested with legal authority, preserve its institutions and
do all that is necessary to sponsor actively the interests of all its members. And
they derive their authority from God, for, as St. Paul teaches, "there is no power
but from God."
Pacem in Terris, supra note 17, T 46.
214. Id. 47 (quoting Pius XII) (alteration in original) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
215. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 122. Finnis further argues that:
[I]t is for the common good of the members of a political community that they
find the truth about divine creation and redemption, live in accordance with that
truth, and so enter and remain for ever in the altogether fulfilling fellowship of the
divine family extending from this world into eternity.
Id.

http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol35/iss1/1

40

Wagner: The Obligation of Government Toward Humanity: The Role of the Sta

2012]

OBLIGATION OF GOVERNMENT TOWARD HUMANITY

41

"sharing" in the authority of God, but the effect is the same without using
the language of theology.
In his theory, Finnis contrasts those who kill in the name of the divine
and offer "carnally seductive incentives" with those who are willing to give
their lives.216 John XXIII detects the same falsehood and goes further to
identify it as the opposite of true liberty:
[A] regime which governs solely or mainly by means of threats and
intimidation or promises of reward, provides men with no effective
incentive to work for the common good. And even if it did, it would
certainly be offensive to the dignity of free and rational human beings.217
In the Pontiff s words, true liberty comes from following one's
conscience. For Finnis, the state provides the freedom for religion's
liberty. In order to provide this, does the state control how men must
think? It would seem that Finnis would answer a qualified "no."2 18 If one
believes that others must be killed for his faith, however, even speaking
this can be silenced, as it threatens public order. Therefore, in some sense,
the state is binding men in their thoughts when they become words or
deeds. Finnis looks to Thomas Aquinas to support his assertion:
Aquinas himself is very clear (at the level of principle) that the coercive
jurisdiction of temporal political authority extends only to external and
inter-personal acts-acts which implicate the community's peace and
justice.... [E]xternal acts are of course, as Aquinas explains better than
into action the internal acts which
anyone, behavior shaped by and putting
219
we call intending and choosing ... .2
By controlling the external, the state directs the internal. John XXIII
speaks the same in the language of conscience saying, "representatives of
the State have no power to bind men in conscience, unless their own
authority is tied to God's authority, and is a participation in it." 220 For the

216. Id. at 111. Finnis notes that:
Apostles who are willing to kill or otherwise coerce, or to offer carnally seductive
incentives ("the women that thy right hand possesses"), in support of their
testimony and of the Prophet's message, should be contrasted with apostles who
make no such threats but are willing to be killed rather than renounce their
testimony or message at the demand of ruthless persons.
Id.
217. Pacem in Terris, supra note 17, 48.
218. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 121-22.
219. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 120.
220. Pacem in Terris, supra note 17, 49.
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Pope, the state authority is a part of divine authority. 22' Finnis avoids this
as he avoids theology, but one cannot avoid the conclusion that in Finnis'
theory, the worlds of theology and philosophy-of religion and state-are
not simply overlapping. Public order serves the common good, which is
salvation itself.222 For the Holy Father, there would be no purpose for
government if it were not to participate in salvation. He says simply, "[t]he
attainment of the common good is the sole reason for the existence of civil

authorities." 223
Finally, Pope John XXIII's encyclical addresses the issue of
philosophy. The next few citations are lengthy, but I believe that
meaningful reflection on them will underscore dramatically the obligation
of the state and the individual member of a society with regard to truth and
religious liberty. In the following passage, the Holy Father recognizes that
there is value in philosophy (Finnis would approve!) and that
philosophizing, if done properly, employing reason and avoiding error, can
contribute to man's salvation:
Again it is perfectly legitimate to make a clear distinction between a false
philosophy of the nature, origin and purpose of men and the world, and
economic, social, cultural, and political undertakings, even when such
undertakings draw their origin and inspiration from that philosophy. True,
the philosophic formula does not change once it has been set down in
precise terms, but the undertakings clearly cannot avoid being influenced to
a certain extent by the changing conditions in which they have to operate.
Besides, who can deny the possible existence of good and commendable
elements in these undertakings, elements which do indeed conform to the
dictates of right reason, and are an expression of man's lawful
aspirations? 224

221. See id. 51 ("Governmental authority, therefore, is a postulate of the moral order
and derives from God. Consequently, laws and decrees passed in contravention of the moral
order, and hence of the divine will, can have no binding force in conscience, since 'it is right
to obey God rather than men."') (citation omitted).
222. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 122. Finnis then states:

But the state is responsible only for temporal common good, and correspondingly
the coercive jurisdiction of state government and law has as its defining objective
not the widest common good which might include salvation itself, but what the
Council calls a (or the) "basic component of the common good," namely public
order.
Id. (emphasis added).
223. Pacem in Terris, supra note 17,154.

224. Id. 159.
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Finnis, in contrast, sees that individuals, as members of the Church
and citizens of a polity, following their religious beliefs and participating in
politics, will draw on the truth of liberty:
Just as the Catholic Church's doctrine of religious liberty is pointedly
aimed, in one direction against secularist (say American) devaluation of the
earnest search for truth about religion and life and secularist (say
Communist) repression of religion, and in the other direction against antiphilosophical and anti-Christian (not to mention anti-Semitic) theocratism,
so too that Church's members, in their political and day-to-day
involvement with issues very fundamental to the legal protection of life and
freedom, find themselves allied, variously, with each of those ends of the
spectrum against the other. That is part of what it is to be central to
civilization.225
Finnis also points to the conclusion that adherents must always act
according to their faith:
[I]t must be accepted that individual voters and legislators can rightly and
should take into account the firm moral teachings of a religion if it is the
true religion, so far as its teachings are relevant to issues of law and
government. This duty extends only so far as the teachings do not depend
upon premises which are essentially questions of present fact and
prediction of consequences, for on such questions religious authorities
cannot reasonably be supposed to have any special competence, or
authority to teach with any decisive effect. In saying that voters and other
bearers of public authority have this liberty and responsibility, I assume
that the true religion itself holds out its moral teaching as a matter of public
reason, i.e. as accessible and acceptable by a purely philosophical enquiry
and only clarified and/or made more certain by divine revelation or the

theological-doctrinal appropriation of that revelation.226
How would John XXIII see it? Exactly the same way as Finnis, with
Catholics following the teaching of the Church, which would also be the
true religion:
As far as Catholics are concerned, the decision rests primarily with those
who take a leading part in the life of the community, and in these specific
fields. They must, however, act in accordance with the principles of the
natural law, and observe the Church's social teaching and the directives of
ecclesiastical authority. For it must not be forgotten that the Church has the
right and duty not only to safeguard her teaching on faith and morals, but
also to exercise her authority over her sons by intervening in their external

225. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 124.
226. Id. at 129 (emphasis added).
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affairs whenever a judgment has to be made concerning the practical
application of this teaching.227
The only fly in this ointment for Finnis would be the "directives of the
ecclesiastical authorities." He could overcome this, however, if the
"direction" were understood not simply in the form of a submission to
authority. He might see it as a teaching based upon the history and
tradition of the Church and included in the discussion as a premise or
argument understood as "philosophical." This gives it rational validity and
allows for its incorporation into a theory of church-state relations. More
likely, however, he would see it as actions by leaders in the community
done in harmony with their faith and ultimately with the true religion.
E. Fides et Ratio
We move on now to the explicitly philosophical, and perhaps most
complete, treatment of our topic in John Paul II's Fides et Ratio. It will
serve our investigation if we first lay out, in summary fashion, the teaching
of Fides et Ratio. With a grasp of John Paul II's treatment of philosophy
and reason and their relationship to faith, we can contrast it with the
arguments and theory of Finnis to arrive at a conclusion about the
orthodoxy of Finnis' positions on church-state relations vis-a-vis the
overlapping duties and obligations of the Church and the state toward each
other and toward individual persons. I apologize if this seems, at times,
needlessly theoretical and will try to keep tangents to a minimum, but it is
necessary to explicate a proper understanding of human nature which, in
turn, is the foundation for the structure and role of the community, also
known as the government, in the lives of the citizenry with regard to
religion.
John Paul II understands his purpose in writing Fides et Ratio as, first
and foremost, to fulfill his duty as a bishop to bear witness to the truth.2 2 8
Second and more directly, it is to reflect upon truth and its relationship to
faith.2 2 9 Remember that, for Finnis, providing an environment conducive
to the search for truth is a civil duty of government. Unlike his
predecessors, John Paul II engages, explicitly and intentionally,
philosophical truth and understanding without spending too much time on
criticisms of specific philosophical systems. In fact, he takes a different
approach from previous pontiffs and-while critical of philosophies that

227. Pacem in Terris, supra note 17, 1 160.
228. See Fides et Ratio, supra note 18,16.
229. Id.
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claim to contain the whole truth of reality-insists that these philosophical
systems should be "respected in [their] wholeness," but that they must also
remain at the service of philosophical inquiry instead of succumbing to
"philosophical pride." 2 30
The Church has an explicit duty toward humanity in the search for
divine truth. In accomplishing this, believers participate in humanity's
shared struggle toward the truth-a truth that every person desires to find.
Although it is not fully accessible in this life, inching closer to it makes
each person more fully human, until we see God "face to face" 23 ' with
complete understanding of the fullness of truth.232 Accessing that truth is
aided tremendously by philosophy, "one of [the] noblest of human
tasks." 23 3 In describing philosophy as a noble task, John Paul II connects
this intellectual duty and the accompanying systems of thought to the
foundation of the human community as one of the basic building blocks:
"One example of [philosophy's powerful influence] is the basic form of
philosophical knowledge which is evident to this day in the postulates
which inspire national and international legal systems in regulating the life
of society." 2 3 4 Philosophy is a task that inspires a polity. The task is
energized by human wonderment, which is not only the basis for legal
systems, but also provides a core of principles understood as "right
reason." 235 This core assists the faithful in deepening their understanding
of faith and of the truth. Once faith is deepened, the yearning for truth
increases, and human reason develops further this desire through countless
fields of knowledge. The modem limitation of reason, however, is its
"one-sided concern to investigate human subjectivity," which has
"forgotten" that the human being is called toward transcendent truth, the
same search for truth for which the Church is obligated to assist all
humanity.2 36
Even without going into direct comparisons just yet, we need to keep
in the back of our mind Finnis' conclusion that the state can and must,
pragmatic concerns aside, identify the true religion. The foundation for this
conclusion is the innate human ability for using reason to grasp the truths
of religion without the need for acts of faith. Reason can be a foundation

230. Id. 4.
231. 1 Corinthians13:12.
232. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18,
233. Id. 3.

2.

234. Id.
235. Id. 11 3-4.
236. Id.

5.
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for finding truth without religious faith, but with the truth of divine
communication included.237
In the Pope's view, reason is wounded by the inclination to turn away
from God and is, therefore, subject to human caprice.238 It becomes
"distorted and inclined to falsehood."23 9 Once hijacked, reason focuses no
longer upon the innate human desire to search for truth, but on the
limitations of reason and, therefore, on the ability to know the truth.24 0
This is the seedbed for relativism and the error that any philosophical
position is as valid as any other. 24 1 There is no place for a theory where
truths are contradictory.24 2 We can see here, early on, that the Pope is
moving toward the differentiation of truth from error in specific
philosophical systems, a distinction made so explicit by his predecessors.
Moreover, he is setting the stage for a battle in which the wounded nature
of reason is cured by and perfected in faith.
The view that reason is wounded is taken from Paul's letter to the
Romans 243 and the conciliar documents, Dei Filius of the First Vatican
Council and Dei Verbum of the Second Vatican Council.244 In this study, I
will not explore these documents, but the principle that the Holy Father
takes from them is important. Reason can discover God.245 Faith provides
knowledge superior to this, however, because it "expresses a truth based
upon the very fact of God who reveals himself. ... 246 Faith is neither
247
reason nor philosophy, nor the product of philosophical inquiry.
Philosophy is limited to natural reason, depends upon sense perception,
and-most importantly-proceeds solely thorough the workings of the
intellect. 248 This Church teaching is reflected in Finnis' theory in that his

237. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 108-09.
238. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, 5.
239. Id. 22.
240. Id. 5.
241. Id.
242. Id. ("[T]he assumption that all positions are equally valid .. . betray[s] this lack of
confidence [in truth], denying truth its exclusive character and assuming that truth reveals
itself equally in different doctrines, even if they contradict one another.").
243. Romans 1:18-30.
244. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, 1 8.
245. Id.
246. Id. 8.
247. Id. 8-9.
248. Id. 9.
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method requires that his conclusions be reached through reason alone.
Does he, however, arrive at his destination without veering from the
teaching of the Magisterium? It is precisely this limited capacity of reason
that Finnis seems to rely upon to move from intellect to truth without
religious faith. The question is whether the limitation he recognizes and
embraces is enough to navigate the error-infested waters of philosophy.
The key for Finnis becomes the acceptance of Revelation, accessible
through the tradition and history of the Church and validated through the
social sciences and the application of reason to those sciences.2 50 I believe
that John Paul II would still find this an incomplete analysis because
mankind cannot fully understand itself without understanding mysterymystery that can be penetrated only through faith.25 1 In support of this, the
Pope cites the Vatican II document Gaudium et Spes and the need to find
ultimate truth through Revelation: "[O]nly in the mystery of the incarnate
Word does the mystery of man take on light." 25 2 He continues, "Faith
alone makes it possible to penetrate the mystery in a way that allows us to
understand it coherently." 25 3 Are these positions really at odds? I think it
is possible to reconcile them if a distinction is made between recognizing
and accepting a mystery of revelation as taught by the Church and
penetrating a mystery in faith.254 Finnis is concerned with a foundation of
man's search for truth-arrived at through the aggregate experience of the
Church-in order to lay an obligation on the state. The Pope, rather, sees
faith as an obedient response to God through which man has access to the
Father "acknowledged in his divinity, transcendence and supreme
freedom." 25 5 The Holy Father's foremost concern is man's salvation and
his assent to the "divine testimony" of revelation through faith.256 For
Finnis, this assent is made possible through fulfillment of the duty the state
owes its citizens to identify truth and to provide the order necessary for
man to engage the personal search for that truth. 257 With this explanation, I
249. See Religion and State, supra note 5, at 107 ("These reflections will be
philosophical and historical or factual, not theological.").
250. Id. at 108-09.
251. Fides et Ratio, supranote 18, T 13.
252. Id. 12 (quoting Pope Paul VI, Encyclical Letter, Gaudium et Spes 22 (Dec. 7,
http://www.vatican.va/archive/hist-councils/iivaticancouncil/documents/vat-ii
1965),
const 19651207_gaudium-et-spesen.html).
253. Id. 13.
254. Id.
255. Id.
256. Id.
257. Religion andState, supra note 5, at 117-18.
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do not see these positions as contradictory understandings of reason.
Rather, for John Paul II, God guarantees the truth, which is ultimately Jesus
Christ himself,2 58 accepted in faith as a gift, and "urges reason to be open to
it and to embrace its profound meaning." 259 That meaning, I believe, is
precisely what Finnis is trying to embrace through his philosophical
acceptance of Revelation. Furthermore, John Paul II does not foreclose
reason completely from the penetration of mystery; it is just that Revelation
is necessary to "lead the search."260
In order to translate this acceptance of Revelation into a philosophical
understanding of human freedom and truth, Finnis has seized upon the
theme of "error has no rights," making it impossible for genuine religious
liberty to be exercised where truth is relative. 26 ' The Pope identifies
freedom not with a pluralistic notion of religious liberty, but with the act of
faith itself.2 62 It is only in the true freedom of will and intellect, in their
spiritual nature, that man can embrace and give himself to God.
Consequently-and critical for an understanding of Finnis-decisions and
acts made against truth are, by their very nature, acts against freedom: "For
how could it be an exercise of true freedom to refuse to be open to the very
reality which enables our self-realization?" 263 For Finnis, this supports his
foundation that man was made to seek truth, and the state's refusal to be
open to that truth is an obstacle to that for which man was made. The Holy
258. John Paul II explains:
From all that I have said to this point it emerges that men and women are on a
journey of discovery which is humanly unstoppable-a search for the truth and a
search for a person to whom they might entrust themselves. Christian faith comes
to meet them, offering the concrete possibility of reaching the goal which they
seek. Moving beyond the stage of simple believing, Christian faith immerses
human beings in the order of grace, which enables them to share in the mystery of
Christ, which in turn offers them a true and coherent knowledge of the Triune
God. In Jesus Christ, who is the Truth, faith recognizes the ultimate appeal to
humanity, an appeal made in order that what we experience as desire and nostalgia
may come to its fulfilment [sic].
Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, 33.
259. Id. 13.
260. Id In the following section of Fides et Ratio, John Paul II identifies the
transformation of creation associated with the reality of revelation in human affairs, saying,
"Revelation therefore introduces into our history a universal and ultimate truth which stirs
the human mind to ceaseless effort; indeed, it impels reason continually to extend the range
of its knowledge until it senses that it has done all in its power, leaving no stone unturned."
Id 14.
261. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 121-22.
262. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, 13.
263. Id. 13.
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Father is, of course, speaking of a personal refusal to accept truth, but the
refusal of the community to identify truth or, worse, to obscure it, is no less
a denial of truth-and a limitation upon man's ability to exercise his true
freedom. Nonetheless, in the eyes of the Church, the fullness of truth is
The Pope expresses the Church's
only attained through faith.
understanding with the teaching that "[m]en and women can accomplish no
more important act in their lives than the act of faith; it is here that freedom
reaches the certainty of truth and chooses to live in that truth."264
It is important to keep in mind the inherent woundedness of reason, as
understood by John Paul II. The accessibility of the truth of Revelation is
limited to faith, which is an expression of love. 26 5 It cannot be reached by
philosophical persuasion. This brings the Pope to an initial conclusion:
"[T]he truth made known to us by Revelation is neither the product nor the
consummation of an argument devised by human reason." 2 6 6 Nevertheless,
there is an "indissoluble unity" 2 67 between faith and reason, and all the
intellectual gains made by philosophy in observing and analyzing humanity
are raised to the fullness of truth by faith in order to make known that in
divine actions it is the God of Israel who reveals Himself, making it
impossible to understand fully revelation without belief in the revealer:
"Thus the world and the events of history cannot be understood in depth
without professing faith in the God who is at work in them. Faith sharpens
the inner eye, opening the mind to discover in the flux of events the
workings of Providence." 2 6 8
John Paul II laid out rules that reason must follow in order to maintain
its correlation with truth: (1) reason must first acknowledge that "human
knowledge is a joumey which allows no rest;" (2) reason must realize that
"such a path is not for the proud who think that everything is the fruit of
personal conquest;" and (3) that reason is "grounded in the 'fear of God'
whose transcendent sovereignty and provident love [is seen] in the
It is difficult to see how Finnis' use of
governance of the world . ...
reason violates any of these principles. Finnis puts no cap on the search for
truth. He refuses (as does the Pontiff) to see truth as relative, but sees
mankind's search for that truth as a vocation that does not end with a
particular discovery. It is the foundation of truth that allows for this

264. Id
265. Id.

15.

266. Id
267. Id 13.
268. Id. 16.
269. Id.

18.
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journey that never ends. 2 7 0 As to the notion of personal conquest, Finnis'
theory does not address the issue much beyond the notion that man exists to
search for truth. He does address, however, self-understandings which
abandon reason and transcendent truth for the "good of self-determination
or of self-respect" in the name of "defin[ing] one's own concept of
existence" or the right to "decide for oneself' as a member of an
organization as opposed to having any authority decide for him. 27 1 The
fallacy here is obvious: if you submit to no authority, what is it that binds
you to the organization? The answer is nothing, of course. This is an
exercise not only in pride but in violation of the third rule-namely, that
God governs the world.272 For this third principle, we are reminded that
Finnis is not so concerned with the source of the state's authority. It is not
incongruous, however, with Finnis' acceptance of Revelation into his
philosophical method that to do so is to recognize God's authority over all.
The source of authority is never addressed specifically in Finnis' theory,
but God's transcendent sovereignty and provident love do not conflict with
the philosophical acceptance of revelation and, therefore, a divine
273
creator.
Once reason is accepted in this fashion, according to these three rules,
reason can be seen to achieve true results, but without faith, one cannot see
the meaning of that truth. 274 Faith cures what sin obscures. 275 Not even
greatness of mind can overcome the reality of sin in humankind: "If human
beings with their intelligence fail to recognize God as Creator of all, it is
not because they lack the means to do so, but because their free will and

270. Id. 2. One could argue that, while the fullness of truth is known when we see God
"face to face," that does not end our existence, but sets it on an eternal path of glory. See id.
Eschatology is not the concern in these writings of this author, but neither do they foreclose
what could be described as the eternal "becoming" that envelops the human person upon
salvation.
271. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 112 (quoting Planned Parenthood v. Casey, 505
U.S. 833, 851 (1992)).
272. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, 118.
273. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 116.
274. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, $ 20.
22. John Paul II describes this in more detail, referring to the Fall of
275. See id
mankind as he reads St. Paul:
All men and women were caught up in this primal disobedience, which so
wounded reason that from then on its path to full truth would be strewn with
obstacles. From that time onwards the human capacity to know the truth was
impaired by an aversion to the One who is the source and origin of truth.
Id.
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their sinfulness place an impediment in the way." 27 6 The Holy Father
explains further:
For the Old Testament, then, faith liberates reason in so far as it allows
reason to attain correctly what it seeks to know and to place it within the
ultimate order of things, in which everything acquires true meaning. In
brief, human beings attain truth by way of reason because, enlightened by
faith, they discover the deeper meaning of all things and most especially of
their own existence. Rightly, therefore, the sacred author identifies the fear
of God as the beginning of true knowledge: "The fear of the Lord is the
beginning of knowledge." 277
A distinction that John Paul II makes, using biblical language, is
between the wisdom of the world and the wisdom of God revealed in
Christ, which-in the eyes of the world-is foolish.278 Reason also needed
to be redeemed by the coming of Christ since the "habitual patterns of
thought" of the human mind had, through the sin of Adam, been rendered
incapable of expressing that true wisdom in its fullness. 2 7 9 That limitation
manifests itself in the inability of human wisdom to see that there is
strength in weakness and to grasp that death could be the source of life.280
Difficult concepts, to be sure, but can these truths be accepted without
faith? Finnis seems to argue that not only is it reasonable but that, in
recognizing that the world is put together in an orderly fashion and with the
need to posit a free and intelligent reality-surpassing our own intelligence
and freedom-which directs this orderliness, we must philosophically "cast
about for historical evidence of ... transcendent revelation." 2 8 1 For Finnis,
doing so does not require the employment of theology. Instead, it is a
matter of common sense: "The judgment that certain events are best
understood as instances of a transcendently revelatory communication is
one that builds on the philosophically (and common-sensically) grounded
affirmation of the existence of a creator, and on historically warranted
affirmations that certain words were spoken and deeds done with certain

intentions." 2 8 2
For John Paul II, would this understanding correspond with being
"fools on Christ's account"? 283 The two could be reconciled if Finnis' idea
276. Id. 19.
277. Id. 20 (citation omitted).

278. Id. 23.
279.
280.
281.
282.
283.

Id. T 22-23.
Id. 23.
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 109.
Id.
1 Corinthians4:10.
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of accepting Revelation were seen as corresponding with John Paul II's
point that the wisdom of the cross is lost on the world unless reason yields
28 4
to this wisdom and accepts the "universality of the truth which it bears."
For the Holy Father, however, this correlation does not seem possible.
Philosophy is still limited to perceptions from sensory data of this world.2 85
In the following sentence, he appears to foreclose such an understanding:
Of itself, philosophy is able to recognize the human being's ceaselessly
self-transcendent orientation towards the truth; and, with the assistance of
faith, it is capable of accepting the "foolishness" of the Cross as the
authentic critique of those who delude themselves that they possess the
truth, when in fact they run it aground on the shoals of a system of their
own devising.286
In Finnis' favor, the Pope does not declare that philosophy can accept the
foolishness of the cross only with the assistance of faith. In the following
sentence, John Paul II speaks of the preaching of Christ crucified as "the
reef upon which the link between faith and philosophy can break up."287 A
reef that, once overcome, enables the two to join forces on the "boundless
ocean of truth." 28 8 The reef is not so much a border as it is a meeting
place. 2 89 This is really the crux of Finnis' theory. 290 Reason can make the
journey to the reef by itself, accepting the truth of Revelation without the
necessity of faith. 29 1 My question to that is-why would you want to?
Simply acquiring intellectual acceptance of truth lacks personal
engagement with the divine. This is why this search should always be
looking for more than meets the eye. If for example, Revelation teaches us
that God became man, is that knowledge accessible to reason without an
assent of faith? The Holy Father provides no visible means to do that. Nor
does he say that it is impossible. The point of unity in Finnis' theory and
the teaching of John Paul II would have to be an almost identical
understanding of the same point with different words. Where the Pope
argues that reason is enlightened when it yields to the foolishness of the
cross, Finnis would have to see the same reality in the philosophical

284. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, T 23.
9 ("[P]hilosophical knowledge ... depends upon sense perception and
285. See id
experience and ... advances by the light of the intellect alone.").
286. Id. 23.

287. Id.
288.
289.
290.
291.

Id.
Id.
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 129.
Id
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acceptance of Revelation. This is a tall order. Sin, however, is a wound.292
In the state of grace, men act without sin, enabling them to "share in the
mystery of Christ, which in turn offers them a true and coherent knowledge
of the Triune God." 2 93 Could John Paul II or any of the popes, allowing for
the possibility of such an accession by reason without any past, present, or
future realization of it, take such a perspective? In other words, could a
cleansed form of reason accomplish what the wounded reason cannot?
Reason is wounded in the thinking of John Paul II, but this woundedness is
a "natural limitation." 2 94 How he understands this nature of reason would
determine how he would look upon the theory of Finnis, but it is difficult to
see, at this point in the analysis, how it could be reconciled. Nevertheless,
let us press on to a deeper understanding of truth.
The innate desire to know the truth is foundational for John Paul II,
and no less important for Finnis. Human beings want to know the truth, to
reject falsehood, and to "discover for ourselves, beyond mere opinions,
how things really are." 295 More than that, this desire is a duty, or as John
Paul II put it: "a prior moral obligation . .. to seek the truth and to adhere to
it once it is known." 296 This is a personal duty. Human beings, however,
live not in a vacuum, but in a community-it is in that community that
language, culture, and fundamental truths are formed and believed.29 7 They
are believed, in fact, without personal experience or verification. 298 Belief
in them is, instead, based upon a personal relationship with other members
of the community that is trusting and intimate.2 99 It is a "dynamic
relationship of faithful self-giving with others." 00 It is knowledge through
belief.301 The fullness of truth is found, then, in the encounter with Jesus
Christ. 30 2 For John Paul II, this is nowhere more evident than in the lives
of the martyrs, who clung to truth in the face of suffering and violent

292. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, 22. (explaining how Adam and Eve's "primal
disobedience. . . wounded reason").
293. Id. T 33.
294. Id. 28.
295. Id. T25.
296. Id. (quoting Pope John Paul 1I, Encyclical Letter, Veritatis Splendor (Aug. 6, 1993)
34, http://www.vatican.va/holy father/john_paul ii/encyclicals/documents/hfjp-ii-enc
06081993 veritatis-splendor en.html).
297. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, T 31.
298. Id.
299. Id. T 32.
300. Id.
301. Id.
302. Id.
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death.303 This is not lost on Finnis. He distinguishes those who are willing
to give their lives for the truth instead of those who are willing to take life
for their religion.3 0 4 Moreover, Finnis recognizes the truth that is found in
communities. 305 That interpersonal sharing is reflective, he hypothesizes,
that there is a greater meaning and sharing, with the infinitely greater
intelligence referred to as "God."3 06 This sharing would be the result of a
communication or "revelation" from God, which explains our own ability
to share with each other as well as our purpose for existing. 307 Could we,
therefore, reconcile the revelation of faith and the revelation gained through
reason, in that they both come to us through the sharing with us of the
other's experience and tradition and of that relationship itself with the
Creator? Does Finnis posit a non-faith-based relationship with God that
can lead us to truth? If Jesus Christ is "the way and the truth and the
life," 308 and reason can discern this reality, is this not a reasonable
accession to truth since it is mediated by the Savior who is accepted as such
through reason? This is the point that Finnis seems to want to make. It
seems like the way one would understand prelapsarian man's relationship
with the Creator. But is that ordered society the gauge for the plight of
postlapsarian man and an understanding of his relationship with God in
light of the Fall and the need for salvation through Christ? I am inclined to
conclude that Finnis' view is that of Eden but that-for the current state of
man, beyond an intellectual exercise-it has limited pragmatic value,
indeed. He himself concedes that acting upon this model would probably
be impractical and imprudent with unintended consequences and side
effects.309 Is that all there is? Holding off on such a judgment for now will
allow us to seek a less dismissive alternate conclusion.
The Holy Father speaks of those who "sought in various ways to
transform faith and its contents, even the mystery of the death and
resurrection of Jesus, into dialectical structures which could be grasped by
reason." 310 Is Finnis guilty of such idealism? I think not. For Finnis, faith
remains a reality that is complimentary to reason. He has no intention of
providing a substitute for reason but seeks a mutually beneficial

303.
304.
305.
306.
307.
308.
309.
310.

Id
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 111.
Id. at 108-09.
Id
See id.
John 14:6.
Religion and State, supra note 5, at 130.
Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, T 46.
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understanding of truth. Does Finnis reduce philosophy to one of many
equally situated fields of human knowing? Marginalize it in favor of
rationalization? Certainly not, for Finnis is interested not in comparative
disciplines but in a serious search for the truth. Does Finnis search for a
utilitarian solution to the problem of understanding human existence? On
the contrary, he sees his search for truth altogether lacking in pragmatism.
Does Finnis propose a philosophical inquiry that is not proved in the light
of reason? Quite the opposite, it is the light of reason that informs his
philosophy. Does Finnis' theory reject Revelation? This appears to be a
nonsensical question, given the focus of this investigation, but it is a
question that we can formulate from John Paul II's understanding of how
philosophy is constituted:
At the deepest level, the autonomy which philosophy enjoys is rooted in the
fact that reason is by its nature oriented to truth and is equipped moreover
with the means necessary to arrive at truth. A philosophy conscious of this
as its "constitutive status" cannot but respect the demands and the data of
revealed truth.31 1
There is a "right" understanding of what has been revealed, and this
can be grasped by philosophy. t 2 The Church, however, must reflect upon
philosophies in the light of faith and discern whether they contradict
Christian doctrine. 1 Faith is, therefore, making demands of philosophy.
It is not restrictive, per se, explains the Pope, because "[t]his discernment,
however, should not be seen as primarily negative, as if the Magisterium
intended to abolish or limit any possible mediation."3 14 Both this statement
and the Pope's words about "constitutive status"315 seem to allow for
Finnis' theory as a "possible mediation" 316 of truth, since he "respect[s] the
demands and the data of revealed truth."3 17 The Church, however, is
always leery and wants to maintain the distinction between faith and
philosophy, especially considering rationalism: "Against all forms of
rationalism, then, there was a need to affirm the distinction between the
mysteries of faith and the findings of philosophy, and the transcendence
and precedence of the mysteries of faith over the findings of

311.
312.
313.
314.
315.
316.
317.

Fides et Ratio, supra note 18,
See id.
Id. 50.
Id. 51.
Id. 49.
Id 51.
Id 49.

49.
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philosophy. ... "
This is not the end of the story because the story of
Revelation is the story of truth. Faith and reason are peas in a pod-to split
them apart would be to deny truth itself:
Even if faith is superior to reason there can never be a true divergence
between faith and reason, since the same God who reveals the mysteries
and bestows the gift of faith has also placed in the human spirit the light of
reason. This God could not deny himself, nor could the truth ever
contradict the truth.3 19

Even with this elevation of philosophy, protected from fideism, John
Paul II hesitates to give philosophy equal billing with theology and faith.
He posits: "Revelation clearly proposes certain truths which might never
have been discovered by reason unaided, although they are not of
themselves inaccessible to reason."32 o I emphasize the final clause
because, while he does not emphasize it, John Paul II always seems to
leave open the possibility that reason can surpass even its wounded state
and find the fullness of truth.
Another way of looking at it, however, is by asking whether-in
finding truth by accepting the data of revelation through reason-you are
also accepting, at that point, the truth of the Revealer in faith, I do believe
that Finnis desires that his theory be accessible to those without faith, but
that does not mean that finding truth through reason alone concludes the

journey. As the Holy Father said, it is always a journey with the goal that
is truth that is Christ. 32 1 If you find that truth, have you not found the
fullness of what God has revealed in faith and reason? Finnis might not
contend that this is true but neither could he disagree with it. His goal is to
make the truth even more accessible to all through philosophical inquiry.
What is the goal of philosophy anyway? How does this goal fit with
the philosophizing of Finnis? The lack of ontological content is the crisis
that the Pope sees in the contemporary philosophical world.32 2 Philosophy
must do three things to become reconciled with truth. It must first recover
its heritage of wisdom: "To be consonant with the word of God, philosophy
318. Id. 53.

319. Id (citation omitted) (internal quotation marks omitted).
320. Id. 76 (emphasis added).
321. See id.T12.
322. Id. 83. The Pope remarks:
If I insist so strongly on the metaphysical element, it is because I am convinced
that it is the path to be taken in order to move beyond the crisis pervading large
sectors of philosophy at the moment, and thus to correct certain mistaken modes
of behaviour now widespread in our society.
Id.
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needs first of all to recover its sapiential dimension as a search for the
ultimate and overarching meaning of life."323 Secondly, philosophy must
"verify the human capacity to know the truth, to come to a knowledge
which can reach objective truth." 3 24 Lastly, philosophy must maintain its
ability to focus on the ontological with "the need for a philosophy of
genuinely metaphysical range, capable, that is, of transcending empirical
data in order to attain something absolute, ultimate and foundational in its
search for truth."32 I do not see how the theory put forth by Finnis violates
any of these newly formulated principles of a true philosophical inquiry.
Based upon this and the rest of my analysis and assessment of Finnis'
philosophical method, I would now have to conclude that his version of
philosophical inquiry follows the understanding of the Holy Father and,
therefore, the teaching of the Magisterium.
CONCLUSION
We have explored the relationship of church and state by examining
John Finnis' theory and method for the state to identify the true religion.
We have done so in the light of Church teaching of the last century and a
half, beginning with the Syllabus Errorum of Pius IX and working
systematically through Immortale Dei and Libertas, two relevant
encyclicals of Leo XIII which reflect on the true meaning of human
freedom. In Leo XII's work, we find that true freedom comes from God,
as does the authority of the state. Obedience to legitimate authority, like
obedience to God, is the method or pathway to truth and salvation. The
state, therefore, has the obligation to protect its citizens from evil and assist
them in their quest for the good. Finnis' theory tracks the Pope's teaching
with his description of the state as obliged to engender common good and
protect from coercion. Libertas also supports Finnis' idea of restrictions on
speech that endanger the state. Pacem in Terris gives us a proper
understanding of authority-order comes from the divine, human beings
were made for order, and the state exists with authority to engender that
order for the origin and purpose of mankind-namely, to seek God. We
finally looked at John Paul II's encyclical Fides et Ratio, in which we
explored philosophical method as understood by the Pope and employed by
Finnis. What, then, shall we conclude about this investigation into this
penetrating study of John Finnis on the relationship between religion and

323. Id. 81 (emphasis original).
324. Id. 82.
325. Id. 83 (emphasis original).
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state? We discovered that, although there are many distinctions, there are
not many differences, and we arrived at a conclusion that Finnis' theory has
validity and reflects what we might call "prelapsarian order" of reality.
Whether it could ever be actualized is another story, a story which Finnis
himself considers problematic in terms of practical application.
One observation regarding methodology worth noting is that Finnis
treats theology as simply an expression that, at a certain point, philosophy
gives way to ("consign[s] us to"). 326 It is difficult to see, therefore, how he
speaks of these methodologies as overlapping. Furthermore, is his purpose
to use religious truth in philosophy without religious dogma? Is religious
and philosophical truth synonymous? In some sense, he does keep
"Jerusalem" at bay but includes it through a back door. Would it not be
more profitable to include Revelation as Revelation instead of including it
as a transcendent communication that is reasonable based upon the natural
sciences? That being said, Finnis does provide fruitful groundwork for
further study into the tension of the relationship between theology and
philosophy and offers some concrete consequences of the harmonizing of
the two fields of study leading man to truth. John Paul II, with all of his
distinctions and qualifications, also saw the effect of harmonizing the two.
The Pontiff writes, "[fJor all their difference of method and content, both
disciplines point to that 'path of life' . . . which, as faith tells us, leads in

the end to the full and lasting joy of the contemplation of the Triune
God."327 The popes, in the end, are concerned about man's salvation.
Finnis has the same concern-it is, in fact, the very reason for his
investigations. He does not look, however, directly to the divine, save
through a mirror darkly. Instead, he is attentive to the obligations of
temporal and legal authority in light of the truth of the transcendent
acquired through philosophical inquiry, engaging the truth of Revelation
and embracing the truth that perfects reason and directs man in his search
for his ultimate good. An authentic awareness of this in governance is
necessary for the maintenance of the common good in its fullest sense,
which is the obligation of government toward humanity.

326. Religion and State, supra note 5, at 109.
327. Fides et Ratio, supra note 18, 1 15 (internal citation omitted).
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